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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

CAMERON THOMAS LOPES,

:

Case No. 20000309-SC

Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for murder, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1996), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, presiding. This Court has
jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the trial court properly modify defendant's sentence by deleting the "inconcert" enhancement, which this Court in State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, 980 P.2d 191, held
had been unconstitutionally imposed?
This issue turns on the trial court's findings concerning the interpretation of
defendant's plea agreement and this Court's opinion in Lopes. The appellate court reviews
the trial court's factual using a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,939
n. 4 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). However, the appellate court reviews the trial court's

conclusions of law based on these findings for correctness, with a measure of discretion
given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts. See id., 869 P.2d at
936-39. "A lower court's interpretation of binding case law presents a question of law which
we review for correctness." State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1997).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Controlling constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are attached at Addendum A:
Utah Constitution, art. VIII, § 16;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203, -203.1 (1995);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-1, -4 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1999);
Rules 11 and 28, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
Rule 30, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
Defendant, Cameron Thomas Lopes, was charged with murder, a first degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1996) (R. 12-17). The information alleged that
in the early morning of February 22, 1996, defendant, along with others as parties to the
offense, went to the residence of Jimmy DeHerrera with the intent to kill the residents in
retaliation for another shooting one week earlier (R. 14-15). There they found Joey Miera
asleep on the floor, and through an open window shot him twice in the head with a .20 gauge
shotgun, killing him (R. 14).
The information also gave notice to defendant that he was subject to enhanced
penalties for the use of a firearm and for having acted in concert with two or more persons,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-203( 1) (Supp. 2000)("firearm enhancement") and 76-3-

2

203.1 (1995) ("in concert enhancement'1), respectively (R. 13).l

Pursuant to a plea

agreement, defendant waived a preliminary hearing and agreed to be bound over to district
court (R. 18-19).
In the trial court, before Judge Sandra Peuler, defendant moved to strike section 76-3203.1 as unconstitutional (R. 38-79). The trial court denied defendant's motion, making
findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its order (R. 94-100). Thereafter,
defendant pleaded guilty to murder and acquiesced in the court's sentencing him under the
gun and in-concert enhancements, in exchange for the dismissal of other charges. He
conditioned his plea to the imposition of the in-concert enhancement on the right to appeal
the court's order rejecting his challenges to the constitutionality of that enhancement,
pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) (R. 18-19, 103; R. 1, 14-16, 1819).2 The court sentenced defendant to a statutory five-to-life term on the murder conviction
(R. 113). The court sentenced defendant to a consecutive one-to-five year term on the

1

Following this Court's opinion in State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, 980 P.2d 191,
section 76-3-203.1 was substantively amended. See 2000 Utah Laws ch. 214, § 2.
Therefore, citations in this brief are to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995), under which
the enhanced penalty was imposed. Also, this brief refers to section 76-3-203.1 as the
"in-concert" enhancement," although it is popularly, though incorrectly, referred to as the
"gang enhancement" See Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at ^ 2 n. 1.
2

In exchange for defendant's guilty pleas, the prosecution agreed to dismiss the
following pending cases: No. 961900546, discharge of a firearm at a person or building, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (1995); No. 961900547,
tampering with evidence, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8510 (1995); and No. 961900816, aggravated arson, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (1995) (R. 103; 363:1, 22).
3

firearm enhancement (R. 114). The court also imposed a consecutive four-year term
following its entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law under subsection (5)(c) of the
in-concert enhancement (R. 114, 117, 122-25).3
Defendant appealed the trial court's imposition of the in-concert enhancement to this
Court. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24 (attached at Addendum B). This Court concluded that
the enhancement was essentially a separate offense each of whose elements must be proven
to the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at ^f 15. The Court found that the "in
concert" element of the enhancement had been determined by the trial court, rather than a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id at f 17. Therefore, the Court found that subsection (5)(c)
of the enhancement, which authorized the trial court to make findings as to the applicability
of the enhancement, unconstitutionally violated defendant's right to a jury trial under article
I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. Id. Consequently, the Court reversed the imposition
of the enhancement and "remandfed] for a new trial on the section 76-3-203.1 charge." Id.
at U22.
On remand, defendant moved before Judge Dennis M. Fuchs, for a new trial on both
the murder and the in-concert offenses (R. 234-36). The prosecution opposed defendant's

3

The imposition of a consecutive four-year term was technically incorrect under
the then-applicable in-concert enhancement. See section 76-3-203.1 (3)(e) (Supp. 1996)
(providing for a minimum term of nine years if the enhanced conviction is a first degree
felony). Although the judgment reflects this error, the court did recognize the correct
sentence in its findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the enhancement and in
sentencing defendant (R. 125; 365:21).
4

motion, arguing that this Court's remand order directed only retrial on the latter offense (R.
334-40 at 338). The prosecutor also argued that defendant's plea contemplated defendant's
right to withdraw only his plea to the imposition of the in-concert offense if he prevailed on
that issue (R. 334-40). In consequence of both this Court's remand order in Lopes, and the
terms of the conditional plea, the prosecution moved to dismiss defendant's plea to the inconcert enhancement and to strike that part of the sentence (R. 337).
Judge Fuchs granted the motion (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order, R.
343-45, attached at Addendum C). Consequently, he dismissed the in-concert charge, deleted
it from defendant's sentence, and denied defendant's motion for a new trial on both the
murder and in-concert offenses (R. 344).4 Defendant timely appealed from this latter ruling
(R. 350).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The relevant facts are set out in the preceding section and are developed in the
argument portion of this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly modified defendant's sentence by deleting that portion
attributable to the in-concert enhancement following the prosecution's motion to dismiss the
charge and this Court's opinion in Lopes. Defendant's claim that Lopes recognized an

4

An undocketed, signed minute entry reflects the trial court's ruling, reimposing
the original sentence absent the in-concert charge (R. 342).
5

"enhanced offense" which included both the in-concert elements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203.1 (1995) and the underlying offense of murder was not preserved in the trial court.
Accordingly, this Court should decline to consider the claim. In any event, Lopes's repeated
reference to the "enhancement offense," which incorporates elements over and above the
underlying offense of murder, as opposed to the "enhanced offense" postulated by defendant,
shows that this Court did not disturb the independent existence of defendant's murder
conviction. Further, both the colloquy in defendant's plea hearing and Lopes'$ discussion
of the enhancement show that defendant and this Court recognized defendant's plea as
conditional only as to the in-concert enhancement and not to his guilty plea to murder. The
record shows that defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled separately to murder and
conditionally to the enhancement, accepting the possibility that he might not be able to
withdraw his guilty plea to murder if he was successful in challenging the in-concert
enhancement on appeal. Any attempt to withdraw the plea at this juncture is unfounded and
untimely.

6

ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS ARGUMENT
CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THIS COURT'S REMAND
ORDER IN LOPES', IN ANY EVENT, THE TRIAL COURT
CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THIS COURT IN LOPES, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLEA, REMANDED THE CASE FOR
RETRIAL ONLY ON THE ENHANCEMENT OFFENSE, LEAVING
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEAS TO MURDER AND THE
FIREARM ENHANCEMENT INTACT AND THAT DEFENDANT
PLED CONDITIONALLY ONLY TO THE IN-CONCERT
ENHANCEMENT
Defendant argues that in reimposing his conviction for murder and dismissing the inconcert charge, the trial court improperly modified this Court's order of remand in Lopes.
Aplt. Br. at 6-13. Specifically, defendant asserts that this Court found that section 76-3203.1 created a new offense — in effect, in-concert murder — which transformed the
underlying murder conviction into an enhanced offense fully embracing the underlying
crime. Aplt. Br. at 7, 26, 29. Thus, defendant argues, the remand order in Lopes required
the lower court to vacate the murder conviction and grant him a retrial on the in-concert
murder. Aplt. Br. at 8-13. Not only is this claim unpreserved, it also misconstrues Lopes.
Defendant also argues that trial court mistakenly ruled that his guilty plea to murder
was unconditional and only his guilty plea to the in-concert enhancement was conditional,
to wit: that he entered "a bifurcated plea." Aplt. Br. at 14,20. Although defendant nowhere
explicitly states how he was prejudiced by this alleged misconstruction of his plea, he
apparently urges that as a result of the trial court's misunderstanding it improperly reimposed
his murder conviction. Lopes, he argues, implicitly recognizes that his pleas to both offenses
7

were conditional Aplt. Br. at 15,25-26. Alternatively, defendant claims that if the plea was
conditional only as to the enhancement, he should now be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea
to murder because it was not knowing and voluntary. Aplt. Br. at 14, 20. This argument
misconstrues the plea-taking.
A. Defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the nature of
this Court's remand order in Lopes.
Defendant argues that in denying his motion for a trial on murder and deleting from
his sentence the in-concert enhancement after the prosecution moved to dismiss it the trial
court improperly modified this Court's remand order in Lopes. Aplt. Br. at 8-13. At the
heart of defendant's argument is a mistaken assumption: "[I]n Lopes /, this Court recognized
that the gang enhancement statute had the effect of transforming an underlying offense into
a new, greater, enhanced offense with a higher punishment. Thus, the 'enhanced offense'
consisted of the elements of the underlying crime and the [sjection 76-3-203.1 elements."
Aplt. Br. at 29. Therefore, defendant concludes that when this Court found "a new and
separate offense" and remanded for a "new trial on the section 76-3-203.1 charge," see
Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at f 22, the Court had effectively melded the underlying murder
conviction with the enhancement, and remanded for a new trial on a single charge that might
be called "in-concert murder." This claim, however, is unpreserved. Not only did defendant
not present this argument to the trial court, he specifically recognized that the murder charge
and the enhancement charge were separate by requesting "a jury trial on both the homicide
charge and the companion gang enhancement charge" (R. 235).
8

"Under ordinary circumstances, appellate courts will not consider an issue... raised
for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error." State v. Helmick,
2000 UT 70, ^[8, 9 P.3d 164 (refusing to consider challenge to eyewitness reliability not
presented to trial court) (citation omitted). See also State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 893 n.6
(Utah 1993) ("Absent exceptional circumstances, this court will not consider issues raised
for the first time on appeal."). "Generally there is no justification for not presenting all
available grounds in support of a motion to suppress, and in the absence of special
circumstances, an appellate court will not rule on grounds not addressed in the trial court."
State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53 (Utah 1981); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985)
(same). See also Onglnt'l v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455, 455 n.31 (Utah 1993)
(refusing to distinguish between new grounds as opposed to new issues and thereby declining
to consider the merits first raised on appeal, citing Carter and Lee).
"The policy behind requiring an appellant to first raise an issue in the trial court is one
of judicial economy and orderly procedure." State in re M. M. J., 908 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah
App. 1995) (citing Clegg v. Lee, 30 Utah 2d 242, 516 P.2d 348, 353 (Utah 1973) (stating
"orderly procedure requires that a party must present his entire case and his theory or theories
to the trial court, and he cannot thereafter urge a different theory")). 'The underlying
considerations of this policy involve allowing the trial court the opportunity to consider, and
perhaps correct, an error claimed by the appellant." Id. (citing Utah County v. Brown, 672
P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983)). See also State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987)

9

(same) (citing State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983)); Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.,
966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (recognizing that a trial court has an opportunity to rule only
if "the issue [has been] specifically raised").
Defendant asserts that his claim, that Lopes recognized a single "enhanced offense"
embracing the underlying murder and the in-concert enhancement, is preserved by his
memorandum supporting his right to a jury trial ("Memorandum," R. 234-84) and the hearing
on his motion for a jury trial following this Court's remand order in Lopes ("Hearing," R.
364:1-17). Aplt. Br. at 3. However, the record shows defendant never presented such a
claim to Judge Fuchs. See Memorandum (R. 234-84); hearing (R. 364:1-17). In fact,
contradicting this very claim, defendant specifically requested a trial on his murder
conviction in addition to his request for a trial on the in-concert charge. See (R. 235) ("Mr.
Lopes now contends that he should be given a jury trial on both the homicide charge and the
companion gang enhancement charge

"). 5 In sum, because defendant failed to preserve

his claim that "in Lopes I this Court recognized that the gang enhancement statute had the
effect of transforming an underlying offense into a new, greater, enhanced offense," see Aplt.
Br. at 29, this Court should decline to consider it.

5

Two pages from defendant's memorandum are missing from the record (R. 23436). However, any reference by defense counsel to defendant's "enhanced offense"
theory is also completely absent from the transcript of the hearing (R. 364:1-17), further
indicating that the theory was never presented to the trial court.
10

B. This Court's remand order in Lopes directed a retrial only as to the
"section 76-3-203.1 charge," a "new and separate offense," and left
defendant's plea to murder and the firearm enhancement intact.
In any event, defendant's claim that this Court in Lopes created an enhanced offense
which "transformed" the underlying offense into a greater offense, thereby nullifying the
independent existence of the underlying offense, seriously misconstrues the scope of this
Court's assessment of the in-concert offense and the remand order.
Nowhere in Lopes does this Court speak to the creation of a single "enhanced offense"
as defendant has conceptualized it. In recognizing that the legislature created "a separate and
new offense," see Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at ^]16, the Court's speaks only of an offense whose
elements are over and above those of the underlying offense rather than of an offense which
incorporates the underlying offense. See id, ("When the legislature passed the gang
enhancement provision, it acted just as it did when it passed the firearm enhancement
provision: it mandated imposition of an enhancement only upon proof of elements over and
above those required for the crime of lesser consequence."); id. at % 17 ("Even though Lopes
pled guilty to the underlying offense, his plea did not establish the requisite mental state of
the other actors, as is necessary to support imposition of the gang enhancement. His plea,
then, did not establish all of the elements of the enhancement offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.") (emphasis added); id. at f21 ("We reverse and remand for a new trial on the gang
enhancement charge") (emphasis added); id. at ^22 ("We reverse and remand for a new
trial on the section 76-3-203.1 charge") (emphasis added). The repeated reference to an

11

"enhancement" offense, as opposed to an "enhanced" offense indicates this Court's
recognition that the new offense was defined by the additional "in-concert" elements
provided by section 76-3-203.1. Nowhere does the Court suggest that the underlying murder
has lost its independent existence by virtue of the creation of the new offense. The plain
reading of the remand order is that this Court ordered a retrial on the "enhancement offense,"
not an "enhanced offense" incorporating, and thereby nullifying, the underlying murder.6
Further, defendant's claim implicitly suggests that Lopes created many new
"enhanced" offenses, each incorporating the underlying offenses enumerated in section 76-3203.1(4), e.g., in-concert robbery, in-concert aggravated assault, etc.. However, subsection
(4) merely identifies those offenses to which the enhancement offense may be applied.
Nowhere in Lopes does the Court suggest that it intended to introduce numerous new

6

Plainly, this Court is well aware that it could not nullify the murder conviction by
''fransforming" it into a greater offense and then ordering the prosecution to go forward
on it, as defendant essentially argues. Aplt. Br. 8-13. The prosecution of criminal laws is
a function of the legislature which is delegated to public prosecutors. Utah Const, art.
VIII, § 16 ("The Legislature shall provide for a system of public prosecutors who shall
have primary responsibility for the prosecution of criminal actions . . . . " ) . Prosecutors,
not the courts, control the initiation and dismissal of prosecutions. See Utah Code Ann. §
77-2-1 (Utah 1999) ("Unless otherwise provided by law, no information may be filed
charging the commission of any felony or class A misdemeanor unless authorized by a
prosecuting attorney."); Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-1 (Utah 1999) ("After commencement of
a prosecution the prosecutor may, upon reasonable grounds, move the magistrate before
whom the prosecution is pending to dismiss the prosecution. If, in the judgment of the
magistrate, the prosecution should not continue, he may dismiss the prosecution and enter
an order of dismissal stating the reasons for the dismissal in the order."). Based on this
substantial authority, this Court would not have melded defendant's underlying murder
conviction with the new, section 76-3-203.1 charge, thereby nullifying the murder charge
and conclusively precluding the prosecution from pursuing it.
12

offenses not specifically defined in the criminal code.
In sum, the remand "for a new trial on the section 76-3-203.1 charge" contemplated
a trial only on the additional in-concert elements of the new statutory offense, leaving
defendant's plea to murder undisturbed. Therefore, the trial court did not act improperly on
this Court's remand order when, following the prosecutions' motion, it dismissed the
"section 76-3-201.1 charge" see Lopes 1999 UT 24 at ^22, and modified defendant's
sentence to show convictions for murder and the firearm enhancement.
Even if defendant was correct in claiming that Lopes created an enhanced offense
combining the elements of the section 76-3-203.1 offense with the underlying offense in a
greater-lesser offense relationship, see Aplt. Br. at 15, 27-28, 30, the trial court still acted
within its discretion in reimposing the murder conviction and dismissing the section 76-3203.1 charge. Defendant cites rule 28(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and rule 30(b),
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in support of his claim that the trial court improperly
modified Lopes' remand "for a new trial on the section 76-3-203.1 charge." Aplt. Br. at 810. Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at f22. Indeed, both rules specify that "[i]f a judgment of conviction
is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless otherwise specified by the appellate court." Utah
R. Crim P. 28(a); Utah R. App. P. 30(b). Defendant's reliance on these rules is entirely
misplaced.

The rules plainly direct the general course of proceedings following a

defendant's successful appeal of an issue amenable to retrial following a reversal on appeal.
No citation to authority is necessary, however, to recognize that the prosecution may dismiss

13

a charge successfully appealed, i.e., the enhancement charge, and that, as a result, the trial
court would not be compelled to uselessly conduct a trial the prosecution had no interest in
pursuing. Defendant's claim would compel needless expense ofjudicial and State resources
for no purpose other than to follow a rule never intended to produce such a result in such
circumstances. In this case, the prosecution declined the opportunity to pursue the section
76-3-203.1 charge on retrial, and the trial court acted properly in dismissing the charge.
Finally, likening the relationship between the section 76-3-203.1 offense and the
underlying offense to a greater and lesser included offense, defendant mistakenly argues that
even if this Court left open whether the trial court could modify its remand order, the court
lacked statutory authority to do so under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1999). Aplt. Br.
at 15, 27-28, 30. Section 76-1-402 provides:
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense,
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of
a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1999) (emphasis added). Because he did not request the
reimposition of his murder conviction, defendant claims that the trial court acted in
contravention of section 76-1-402(5). Defendant's argument fails for several reasons. First,
as discussed above, Lopes does not make murder a lesser included offense of the section 763-203.1 offense; the latter is a "separate" offense. Lopes 1999 UT 24 at % 16. Second, section
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76-1-402(5) contemplates a scenario in which there has been a conviction only of the greater
offense and not of the lesser offense. In this case, however, defendant was convicted of the
lesser offense through his guilty plea. Third, although defendant sought a trial on the murder
conviction on remand, he did request the entry of his conviction on the "lesser" murder
charge when he voluntarily and unconditionally entered his guilty plea to that offense. Thus,
section 76-1 -402(5) would not curtail the trial court's power to reimpose defendant's murder
conviction in this case.
In sum, the trial court correctly recognized the scope of this Court's remand order in
Lopes, and accordingly, correctly allowed the prosecution to dismiss the in-concert charge
and modified defendant's sentence to reflect his murder and firearm enhancement
convictions.
C

Defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded unconditionally
guilty to murder and conditionally guilty to the in-concert offense.

On remand from this Court, Judge Fuchs reviewed the transcript of the change of plea
hearing and correctly concluded that defendant was "entitled to a trial on the § 76-3-203.1
(gang enhancement) charge, not on the criminal homicide charge with firearm enhancement"
(R. 343-44). In support of that conclusion, the court made the following findings of fact: (1)
defendant had entered separate pleas to the criminal homicide charge and to the in-concert
and firearm enhancements at his change of plea hearing; (2) defendant pleaded conditionally
only as to the in-concert enhancement; (3) "Judge Peuler made it very understandable to
defendant that one possible effect of a successful appeal of her ruling on the constitutionality
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of the gang enhancement would be that he might not be able to withdraw his guilty plea to
the criminal homicide charge, but rather only have his sentence adjusted; and (4) "[t]he
remand from the Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Lopes, ordered only that the defendant be
allowed 'a new trial on the section 76-3-203.1 charge'" (R. 343-44).
The colloquy at the plea hearing, attached in its entirety at Addendum D, fully
supports the court's findings and conclusion:
THE COURT [Judge Peuler]: All right. Now I understand that this plea
today is in the nature of what we call a Ceri [sic] plea.
MR. PETERSON [Defense Counsel]: That's true, Judge.
THE COURT: Have you gone over that kind of a plea agreement with your
attorney, Mr. Lopes.
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, for the record, I've explained to Mr. Lopes
that we will be potentially appealing the Court's application of a
minimum mandatory gang enhancement sentence in this case based
on your previous legal ruling where we asked the Court to declare
the gang enhancement statute unconstitutional. And Mr. Lopes
understands we will be pursuing that appeal even after the time he is
sentenced in this case.
Is that true?
MR. LOPES: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Do you understand that when you enter a guilty
plea today, I will go ahead and if I find it appropriate, receive your
guilty plea and then I will go ahead and sentence you. If your
attorney and you decide to appeal the pretrial ruling and you prevail
on appeal, that is the appellate court decides that I was wrong, and
the gang enhancement statute is unconstitutional then you would be
allowed to withdraw your guilty plea.
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However, if you appeal and you loose [sic], and the appellate court
says that I was right, then you're stuck, basically. You can't ask the
Court to let you withdraw your guilty plea. In other words, what you
do today would be permanent. Did I make a mis-statement?
MR. YBARRA [Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I believe that if the appeal's [sic]
court finds that the gang enhancement is not constitutional, it would
simply, it would be a modification of his sentence. It wouldn't be an
admission to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. YBARRA: We'd simply strike out that part of the sentence.
THE COURT: Is that your understanding?
MR. PETERSON: Well, that's not clear. Unfortunately under Gibbons it's
unclear whether it would invalidate, inviciate [sic] the whole plea and
whether we would have to re-enter a five to li[f]e plea or not, but
Mr. Ybarra may be correct.
THE COURT: Okay. I think Mr. Lopes ought to understand what's possible
under a worse case scenario so I believe that it's possible under a
reading of the case on Mr. Lopez [sic] that if the appellate court says
that I was wrong on the gang enhancement statute that you may not be
able to withdraw your guilty [sic], you may simply have your
sentence adjusted. Now, I understand that there may also be a
possibility that you could withdraw your guilty plea at that time but
I'm not certain about that and I don't know if anybody is at this point.
MR. PETERSON: We're not, Judge.
THE COURT: Okay. So you understand the possibility?
MR. LOPES: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Do you have any other questions that you want to
ask your attorney or the Court before we go any further, Mr. Lopes?
MR. PETERSON: I don't have anything, your Honor.
17

MR. YBARRA: I don't believe so, Judge.
(R. 363:14-16) (emphasis added).
The foregoing colloquy shows that defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered a
conditional guilty plea only as to the section 76-3-203.1 charge. The prosecutor stated his
belief that defendant would not be entitled to withdraw his guilty plea to murder even if he
prevailed on appeal, a belief defense counsel acknowledged "may be correct." Accordingly,
the trial court informed defendant that if he was successful on appeal he might be not be able
to withdraw his guilty plea to murder. The court did not qualify or restrict its ultimate
authority to find that defendant's plea was only partly conditional. Thus, with knowledge of
this "possibility," the prosecution's understanding, and his own counsel's begrudging
agreement, defendant readily agreed to enter a guilty plea to murder and to accept the court's
imposition of the gun and in-concert enhancements.
Moreover, Judge Fuchs correctly recognized that the proceedings before Judge Peuler
showed that defendant pled separately to the murder charge and the enhancements and that
his plea was conditional only as to the in-concert charge. After eliciting defendant's
understanding of the possible outcomes of his plea, Judge Peuler read the criminal homicide
charge and the firearm and in-concert enhancements as set out in the information. The
following colloquy ensued:
THE COURT: To the charge, Mr. Lopes, as I've announced, how do you
plead, sir?
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, could you take that a piece at a time if you
18

don't mind. Because I've got to preserve Ceri [sic] exactly.
THE COURT: All right, as - MR. PETERSON: Well - - I'm sorry, go ahead.
THE COURT: As to Count One, criminal homicide murder, a first degree
felony, Mr. Mierra [sic], excuse me, Mr. Lopes, having caused the
death of Mr. Mierra [sic].7 How do you plead, sir?
MR. LOPES: I plead guilty to the last alternative, under the last alternative.
THE COURT: As to evidencing depraved indifference to human life that
you engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death of
another and thereby caused the death of Joey Mierra [sic]?
MR. LOPES: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. I do find, Mr. Lopes, that your plea is knowingly
and voluntarily made. I'll therefore receive it and enter it as a
conviction at this time.
As to the other two portions of that, Mr. Peterson, how do you wish
to proceed?
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, we wish to enter Ceri [sic] plea relative to
the gang enhancement provision under 76-3-203.1. If you want to
inquire about this plea, I would advise Cameron Lopes to say guilty
under State v. Ceri [sic]
THE COURT: All right. As to the gang enhancement statute found at
76-3-203.1, as to that enhancement, Mr. Lopes, how do you plead?
MR. LOPES: Guilty under State versus Ceri [sic].
THE COURT: All right. And as to the firearm enhancement, Mr. Lopes,
7

The victim's last name is consistently spelled, "Miera," throughout the
proceedings. See Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at ^ 2.
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how do you plead?
MR. LOPES: Guilty as a party to the offense.
THE COURT: All right. I do find that you plea of guilty to all of the above
is knowingly and voluntarily made. I'll therefore enter them as a
conviction at this time.
(R. 18-19).
The foregoing colloquy supports Judge Fuch's findings of fact. In particular, the
colloquy plainly shows that, upon the deliberate and unchallenged advice of counsel,
defendant separately pled guilty to murder and to each enhancement and that only
defendant's plea to the in-concert enhancement was preserved under Sery.
The individual and separable nature of defendant's guilty plea to murder is reinforced
by defendant's plea affidavit. The affidavit indicates that defendant is entering a guilty plea
to "criminal homicide/murder," which term is immediately followed by an asterisk. The
asterisk refers the reader to the basis for the murder plea: "In exchange for this plea, the
State will dismiss Third District Court (Division I) cases 961900547 (Evid Tamp),
961900546 (Disch Firearm), and 961900816 (Ag Arson)" (Statement of Defendant, R. 10309, at 103, attached at Addendum E), Only below and after the asterisk does the affidavit
state, in parenthesis, that "[T]he court may impose an enhanced sentence by applying the
firearm enhancement and/or gang enhancement" (R. 103). Further, the affidavit, signed by
defendant only two days before the change of plea hearing, nowhere indicates that the guilty
plea to murder is conditional (R. 103-09). In sum, the trial court correctly concluded that
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defendant was only "entitled to a trial on the § 76-3-203.1 (gang enhancement) charge, not
on the criminal homicide charge with gun enhancement" (R. 343-44).
In various ways defendant asserts that if the plea was only conditional as to the inconcert enhancement, the plea was unknowing and involuntary and he should now be
allowed to withdraw it. Aplt. Br. at 14,20,23. Thus, he argues, the prosecution should have
more clearly stated that the plea was "bifurcated" (Aplt. Br. at 15) and that the State on
appeal led this Court to believe the plea was conditional in its entirety (Aplt. Br. at 23-25).
Defendant's first assertion, that his plea was unknowing and involuntary as a result of the
prosecution's failure to more clearly define the plea, is unsupported on the record recited
above.
Defendant's second assertion, that the State on appeal led this Court to believe the
plea was conditional in its entirety, is equally unfounded. In support of this contention,
defendant first recites the State's rendition of the trial court's taking in his plea from the
"Statement of the Case and Facts," in the State's responsive brief. Aplt. Br. at 23-24 (citing
Aple. Br. at 3-4). These statements do not categorically define the nature of the plea, and
even if they did suggest that the entire plea was conditional it would hardly affect the true
nature of defendant's actual plea. Moreover, the extent to which the plea was conditional
and unconditional was not at issue in Lopes. Rather, the State was focused on defendant's
challenges to the legality of the in-concert enhancement and not on the precision of its
rendition of unrelated procedural facts. Thus, any suggestion that the State was definitively
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proclaiming the detailed nature of the plea is misplaced.
Defendant also attempts to bolster his accusation that the State led this Court to
believe that the plea was entirely conditional by arguing that the State failed to clarify its
understanding of the plea in its petition for rehearing. Aplt. Br. at 24-25. In so arguing,
defendant assumes that this Court's remand order embraces his view that the plea was
entirely conditional and that this Court's references to the new "section 76-3-203.1 charge"
included the charge for murder under section 76-5-203. As argued below, defendant's
assumption is mistaken. This Court's remand order directed only a "new trial on the section
76-3-203.1 charge," that is, on the "in concert" enhancement. Taking the remand order at
face value, the State felt no need to clarify its understanding of the plea.
Moreover, defendant's alternative claim, that if his plea is determined to have been
only partly conditional then it was unknowing and involuntary and he should be allowed to
withdraw it, is made too late. Any request to withdraw a guilty plea must be made within
30 days after the entry of the plea, where, as here, defendant was advised of the time limit
(R. 363:19). See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2) (b) (1999); Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (e).
Therefore, even if defendant's plea were unknowing and involuntary, the trial court would
lack jurisdiction to set aside the plea. See State v. Tarnwiecki, 2000 UT App 186, ^| 8, 5 P.3d
1222 (holding that because the thirty-day time period for moving to withdraw a guilty plea
is jurisdictional, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider a motion to withdraw the plea of
a defendant informed of the period filed after the thirty-day period) (citing State v. Price, 837
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P.2d 578, 583 (Utah App.1992)).
In sum, neither the prosecution nor the State on appeal led defendant or this Court to
misconstrue the true nature of his partially conditional plea, a conclusion Judge Fuchs
reasonably and fully concurred with. As such, defendant's conditional plea only as to the inconcert enhancement was knowing and voluntary. Any request to withdraw the plea is both
unfounded and untimely.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests this Court to affirm
defendant's conviction and enhanced sentence.
4*

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J / _ day of January, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney, General
/ KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 16. [Public prosecutors.]
The Legislature shall provide for a system of public prosecutors who shall
have primary responsibility for the prosecution of criminal actions brought in
the name of the State of Utah and shall perform such other duties as may be
provided by statute. Public prosecutors shall be elected in a manner provided
by statute, and shall be admitted to practice law in Utah. If a public prosecutor fails or refuses to prosecute, the Supreme Court shall have power to appoint a prosecutor pro tempore.

CRIMINAL CODE

76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of imprisonment — Increase of sentence if firearm
used.
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may be
for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of
the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently;
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree,.for a term at not less
than one year nor more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm
or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally
sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively
and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently;
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed
five years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of
the felony, the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a
felony in which a firearm was used or involved in the accomplishment of
the felony and is convicted of another felony when a firearm was used or
involved in the accomplishment of the felony shall, in addition to any other
sentence imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate term to be not less
than five nor more than ten years to run consecutively and not concurrently.

76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons
— Enhanced penalties.
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) in concert
with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense
as provided below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means
the defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable for
the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202.
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grandjury if an indictment is returned,
shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases or
the information or indictment in felony cases notice that the defendant is
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. The notice
shall be in a clause separate from and in addition to the substantive
offense charged.
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court may subsequently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging document to include
the subscription if the court finds the charging documents, including any
statement of probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the
allegation he committed the offense in concert with two or more persons,
or if the court finds the defendant has not otherwise been substantially
prejudiced by the omission.
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this section are:
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the convicted person shall
serve a minimum term of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other secure
correctional facility.
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the convicted person shall
serve a minimum terra of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other secure
correctional facility.
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison.
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years in prison.
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison.
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which a life sentence is imposed,
the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 20 years in
prison.
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c,
regarding drug-related offenses;
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1;
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2;
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3;
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4;
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3;
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1;
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76,
Chapter 6, Part 2;
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3;
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4;

(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections
76-6-503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 766-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and
76-6-520;
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Part 3, Title
76, Chapter 8, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307,
76-8-308, and 76-8-312;
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508;
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in
Section 76-8-509;
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3;
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5;
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses
under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12;
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13;
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety
Act;
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful
Activity Act;
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801;
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering
and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002.
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense but provides an
enhanced penalty for the primary offense.
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section
that the persona with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense.
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to
impose the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this
section is applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter
written findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section.
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence
required under this section if the court:
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; and
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the
record and in writing.

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

77-2-1. Authorization to file information.
Unless otherwise provided by law, no information may be filed charging the
commission of any felony or class A misdemeanor unless authorized by a
prosecuting attorney.

77-2-4. Dismissal of prosecution.
After commencement of a prosecution the prosecutor may, upon reasonable
grounds, move the magistrate before whom the prosecution is pending to
dismiss the prosecution. If, in the judgment of the magistrate, the prosecution
should not continue, he may dismiss the prosecution and enter an order of
dismissal stating the reasons for the dismissal in the order.

77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
( D A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause
shown and with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a
reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be baaed on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, an affidavit reciting these factors after the court has established
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the
affidavit. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be
sufficient that the affidavit has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has

agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by
the court.
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not
binding on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the
proposed disposition will be approved.
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.

Rule 28. Disposition after appeal.
(a) If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless
otherwise specified by the appellate court. Pending a new trial or other
proceeding, the defendant shall be detained, or released upon bail, or otherwise restricted as the trial court on remand determines proper. If no further
trial or proceeding is to be had a defendant in custody shall be discharged, and
a defendant restricted by bail or otherwise shall be released from restriction
and bail exonerated and any deposit of funds or property refunded to the
proper person.
(b) Upon affirmance by the appellate court, the judgment or order affirmed
or modified shall be executed.
(c) Unless otherwise ordered by the trial court, within 30 days after receir*
of the remittitur, the trial court shall notify the parties and place the m a S
the calendar for review.
^won

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 30. Decision of the court: dismissal; notice of decision.
(a) Decision in civil cases. The court may reverse, affirm, modify, or
otherwise dispose of any order or judgment appealed from. If the findings of
fact in a case are incomplete, the court may order the trial court or agency to
supplement, modify, or complete the findings to make them conform to the
issues presented and the facts as found from the evidence and may direct the
trial court or agency to enter judgment in accordance with the findings as
revised. The court may also order a new trial or further proceedings to be
conducted. If a new triad is granted, the court may pass upon and determine all
questions of law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary
to the final determination of the case.
(b) Decision in criminal cases. If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new
trial shall be held unless otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of
conviction or other order is affirmed or modified, the judgment or order
affirmed or modified shall be executed.
(c) Decision and opinion in writing; entry of decision. When a judgment,
decree, or order is reversed, modified, or the reasons shall be stated concisely
in writing and filed with the clerk. Any justice or judge concurring or
dissenting may likewise give reasons in writing and file the same with the
clerk. The entry by the clerk in the records of the court shall constitute the
entry of the judgment of the court.
(d) Decision without opinion. If, after oral argument, the court concludes
that a case satisfies the criteria set forth in Rule 31(b), it may dispose of the
case by order without written opinion. The decision shall have only such effect
as precedent as is provided for by Rule 31(f).
(e) Notice of decision. Immediately upon the entry of the decision, the clerk
shall give notice to the respective parties and make the decision public in
accordance with the direction of the court,
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
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Defendant pled guilty in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Sandra N.
Peuler, J., to charge of murder, with firearm
and gang enhancements, and he appealed.
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held
that: (1) application of "gang enhancement"
statute to enhance sentence of defendant
convicted of murder violated defendant's due
process rights, and (2) subsection of gang
enhancement statute which provides that trial judge, rather than jury, will decide
whether to impose enhancement violated defendant's right to jury trial under state constitution.
Reversed and remanded.
Russon, J.v filed a dissenting opinion in
which Howe, C.J., joined.
1. Criminal Law 3=» 1134(3)
A constitutional challenge to a statute
presents a question of law, which the Supreme Court reviews for correctness
2. Constitutional Law <&»48(1,3)
When addressing a constitutional challenge to the validity of a statute, the Supreme Court presumes that the statute is
valid, and resolves any reasonable doubts in
favor of constitutionality.

to commit the same underlying offense; and
(2) directly committed the underlying offense
or solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided one of the other
two actors to engage in conduct constituting
the underlying offense. U.C.A.1953. 76-3203.1(l)(a, b).
5. Criminal Law <3»1208.6<1)
For purposes of gang enhancement statute, phrase "in concert" means that the defendant acted with at least two other people
and that those other persons must also be
liable for the underlying offense. U.C.A.
1953,76-3-203.1(l)(a,b).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

6. Constitutional Law <3=>27(X2)
Criminal Law <s=>1208.6<5)
Application of "gang enhancement" statute to enhance sentence of defendant convicted of murder violated defendant's clue
process rights, where state failed to prove
accomplices1 criminal culpability beyond a
reasonable doubt
U.C.A.1953, 76-32Q3.1(l)(a, b).
7. Jury ^31.1
Gang enhancement statute creates new
offense separate from that underlying enhancement, and thus subsection of statute
which provides that trial judge, rather than
jury, will decide whether to impose enhancement violated defendant's right to jury trial
under state constitution. Const Art 1, § 12;
U.C A1953, 76-3-203.1(l)(a, b)
8. Constitutional Law <s»48U)
Statutes, where possible, are to be construed so as to sustain their constitutionality.

3. Criminal Law <£»13<2)
The legislature has broad authority to
define crimes and prescribe punishments.

9. Statutes **to(l)
If a portion of an otherwise unconstitutional statute might be saved by severing the
unconstitutional provision, such should be
done.

4. Criminal Law <3=»1208.6<l)
Under "gang enhancement" statute,
state is required to prove that all three actors: (1) possessed a mental state sufficient

10. Statutes <s=»64(l)
To determine if a statute is severable
from its unconstitutional subsection, the Supreme Court looks to legislative intent
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11. Statutes <3=>64(1)
If the legislative intent behind a statute
is not expressly stated, the Supreme Court,
in order to determine the severability of an
unconstitutional provision, then turns to the
statute itself, and examines the remaining
constitutional portion of the statute in relation to the stricken portion.
12. Statutes ^64(1)
If the portion of the statute remaining
after an unconstitutional provision is stricken
is operable and still furthers the intended
legislative purpose, the statute will be allowed to stand.
13. Statutes e»64(6)
Subsection of gang enhancement statute
which unconstitutionally requires trial judge,
rather than jury, to decide whether to impose
enhancement, would be severedfromremainder of statute; severance would not destroy
statute's purpose of imposing higher penalties when offense is committed by three persons acting in concert. Const Art 1, § 12;
U.CA.1953,76-£-203.1(l)(a, b).

Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Kenneth A. Bronston, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff.
Linda M. Jones, Michael A. Peterson, Kimberiy A. Clark, Salt Lake City, for defendant
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
11 Cameron Thomas Lopes appeals from
a judgment and conviction for murder, a first
degree felony, and enhanced sentences imposed by the district court pursuant to sections 76-3-203(1) and -203.1 of the Utah
Code. Lopes asks this court to reverse the
group criminal activity enhancement on the
basis that section 76-3-203.1 violates both
the federal and Utah constitutions. We hold
1. Lopes refers to section 76-3-203.1 as the
"gang" enhancement statute. The State correctly points out in its brief that the legislature did
not create a "gang" enhancement although the
statute is popularly known by that name. We
agree with the State that referring to the statute
as a "group criminal activity" enhancement is
more accurate than "gang" enhancement Nevertheless, we have previously referred to the statute under its commonly known name, see Stat* v.

that the application of section 76-3-203.1 in
this case did deprive Lopes of certain fundamental constitutional rights. Furthermore,
we hold subsection (5)(c) of section 76-3203.1 violates the Utah Constitution. We,
therefore, reverse and remand for a new
trial.
112 In March of 1996, the State charged
Lopes and several other individuals with
murder, a first degree felony, in violation of
section 76-6-203 of the Utah Code. The information alleged that early in the morning
of February 22, 1996, Lopes, along with
three other persons who were parties to the
offense, went to the residence of Jimmy DeHerrera with the intent to kill the occupants.
One of the defendants fired two shots from a
.20 gauge shotgun into an open window.
Both shots hit and killed Joey Miera, who
was asleep on the floor. The information
further alleged that the defendants shot Miera in retaliation for another shooting one
week earlier that killed one of the defendant's friends. The information also gave
notice to Lopes that he was subject to enhanced penalties for the use of a firearm,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1)
(Supp.1998) ("firearm enhancement"), and for
having acted in concert with two or more
persons, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 763-203.1 (1995) ("group criminal activity" or
"gang" enhancement).1 Lopes waived his
preliminary hearing and agreed to be bound
over to the district court
13 In the district court, Lopes moved to
strike the gang enhancement as unconstitutional under both the state and federal constitutions. The court denied his motion.
Thereafter, he pleaded guilty to the homicide
offense, with enhancements, in exchange for
dismissal of charges pending against him in
another case. Lopes conditioned his plea
pursuant to StaU v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah
CtApp.l988).a Lopes's conditional plea preAlvarez. 872 P.2d 450. 461 (Utah 1994), and we
will continue to do so for ease of reference.
2. The Sery decision, which this court has endorsed, see State v. Rivera, 943 P.2d 1344, 134445 (Utah 1997); Utah RXrim. P. I l(i). permits a
criminal defendant to plead guilty while preserving issues for appeal. In this case, Lopes specifically preserved his right to appeal the constitutionality of the gang enhancement statute.
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served his right to challenge the constitutionality of the gang enhancement statute.
if 4 Thereafter, the trial court issued findings that Lopes was subject to an enhanced
penalty under section 76-3-203.1 and entered
judgment against him.3 The trial court sentenced Lopes to an indeterminate term of
five years to life. The court also enhanced
the sentence under the gang enhancement
statute, sentencing Lopes to an additional
four years to "run consecutively and not concurrently with the basic sentence." Lopes
appeals that order.

Separationists, Inc v. Whitehead 870 P.2d
916, 920 (Utah 1993): Mountain States Tel
& Tel Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P„2d 184,
187 (Utah 1991).

3. Lopes objected to the first paragraph of the
judge's findings and conclusions regarding applicability of the gang enhancement statute because
the judge had suggested that the. issue was
waived. As first written, that paragraph stated:

the requisite mental state for murder. This
means that the issue of the applicable burden of
proof is squarely before us today. See infra f 9

[3) 1 7 In response to Lopes's argument
that in enacting the gang enhancement statute, the legislature created a new crime, the
State notes that the legislature specifically
expressed an intent that the gang enhancement not be a separate offense. The legislature does have broad authority to define
crimes and prescribe punishments. See
State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 263-64 (Utah
15 Lopes contends that the gang enhance- 1986); State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 994-95
ment statute creates a separate criminal of- (Utah 1978). However, although the legislafense by combining a separate mental ele- ture specifically stated in the statute that it
ment—"in concert"—with a criminal act and, intended section 76-3-203.1 to be an entherefore, for the statute to satisfy state and hancement, this is not dispositive as to what
federal due process concerns, the State must the legislature actually did.
prove the elements of the enhancement be[4,5] 18 The gang enhancement statute
yond a reasonable doubt, as with any other
crime. He also asserts that section 76-3- provides in part;
203.1(5)(c) interferes with his right to a jury
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense
trial, as guaranteed by article L section 12 of
listed in Subsection (4) in concert with two
the Utah Constitution.4
or more persons is subject to an enhanced
penalty for the offense as provided below,
[1,21 1 6 A constitutional challenge to a
(b) "/n concert with two or more perstatute presents a question of law, which
sons'*
as used in this section means the
we review for correctness. See State v.
defendant
and two or more other persons
Mohi 901 P.2d 991, 996 (Utah 1996).
would
be
OTminaily
liable for the offense as
When addressing such a challenge, this
parties under Section 76-2-202.
court presumes that the statute is valid,
and we resolve any reasonable doubts in Utah Code Ann. § 76-*-208.1(l)(a) & (b)
favor of constitutionality. See Society of (1995) (emphasis added). Section 7&-2-202,

In his Statement of Defendant [sic] executed in
connection with his entry of guilty plea and in
his colloquy with die court the defendant
although challenging its constitutionality, acknowledged the applicability of the gang enhancement as pleaded by the state.
After objection, the first paragraph was changed
to read:
Defendant admitted that he went with at least
two other people to Joey Miera s home for the
purpose of retaliating for a fellow gang members shooting, and with the stated purpose of
"[gettling the punka."
By making this modification, the trial court
acknowledged that Lopes never conceded that all
the elements of the enhancement statute were
satisfied i f that the other individuals shared

4.

Lopes raises a senes of other claims. He argues that the statute interferes with his fundamental due process rights because it denies him
his nght to a preliminary hearing, which article
I. section 13 of the Utah Constitution guarantees.
In the alternative, he argues that the statute
identifies additional elements of the underlying
offense that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to the same trier of fact who
decided guilt on the predicate crime. And finally* Lopes argues on appeal that the statute violates the federal Due Process Clause because it is
vague and overly broad and that it violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution and the uniform operation of laws
provision of the Utah Constitution. Because we
decide this case based on the fundamental rights
arguments in the text, we do not need to address
these additional constitutional challenges.
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referred to in section 76-3-203.1(1 Kb), states
that a person who acts "with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense,"
and "either directly commits the offense, [or)
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to engage
in conduct which constitutes an offense shall
be criminally liable as a party for such conduct." Id § 76-2-202. In summary, section
76-3-203.1(1 )(a) requires that ail three actors
must (i) have possessed a mental state sufficient to commit the same underlying offense
and (ii) have directly committed the underlying offense or solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided one of
the other two actors to engage in conduct
constituting the underlying offense. At a
minimum, under the statute, the State must
prove that all three actors are guilty of "aiding and abetting." This was the effective
holding of our decisions in State v. Labrum,
925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996) ("Labrum r) and
State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994).
In Labrum /, we made it clear that "in
concert" under the gang enhancement statute means that the defendant acted with at
least two other people and "that those other
persons must also be liable for the underlying offense." Id at 940; see also California
v. Zermena, 61 Cal.App.4th 623, 628, 71 Cal.
Rptr.2d 672 (Cal.CtApp.1998) (holding that
statute imposing enhanced sentence upon
showing of "pattern of criminal gang activity"
required State to show beyond a reasonable
doubt that at least one other actor was guilty
of "aiding and abetting" defendant).
19 This leads us to the burden of proof
issue. In Labrum /, we did not address the
burden of proof by which the State must
prove the (4in concert" element of the gang
enhancement statute, but the court of appeals did address that question In a subsequent appeaL In Labrum /, we stated that
before imposing the gang enhancement, the
statute required uthe sentencing judge [to]
make discrete . . . findings" that are 'Indispensable to the gang enhancement statute
because they establish the legal basis that
justifies imposition of the prescribed penalty." Labrum I 925 P.2d at 940. We reS. The court of appeals decided Labrum II after
oral argument in the present case. Pursuant to
rule 24(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-

manded Labrum I for further proceedings
because "no specific finding was entered with
respect to the complicity of the other two
persons who accompanied Labrum.'' Id at
941. On remand, the trial court made factual
findings regarding the other two actors' participation and then enhanced Labrums sentence. See State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120.
121 (Utah Ct.App.1998) rLabrum
ID.
Labrum again appealed.
110 Before the court of appeals, Labrum
argued that the sentencing court's findings
were legally insufficient to fix accomplice liability. Labrum premised his argument on
both the language of the statute and due
process. The court of appeals reversed the
enhancement on grounds that the findings
were insufficient It did not address the
constitutional question; instead, it held:
Under this statute, it is not enough that
others were present when the crime was
committed. Rather, the quality of their
involvement must rise to the level of participation described in section 76-2-202,
Id at 124. The court of appeals then went
on to say that all three actors "must possess
a sufficiently culpable mental state, and the
prosecution must prove the foregoing beyond
a reasonable doubt" Id (emphasis added).
Because the court of appeals appeared to
rely on statutory interpretation to fix the
burden of proof, it had no occasion to address
Labrum's constitutional challenges.3
[6] 111 Today, Lopes presents to this
court a challenge to the gang enhancement
statute that is essentially identical to the one
passed upon by the court of appeals in Labrum II. He contends that the State must
prove all the elements of accomplice liability,
including the mental state, beyond a reasonable doubt We agree with Lopes and conclude that the statutory "enhancement" requires proof of the other actor's criminal
culpability, and that the State must prove
their criminal culpability beyond a reasonable doubt This conclusion finds support in
dure, Lopes notified this court of the Labrum 11
decision.
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elements of a mrw bevond i m'i.snnaHp
doubt.").
114 Furthermore, and independently, as a
112 In Angus, the defendant was charged
statutory matter, the Code requires that the
with aggravated assault, and the State State prove each element of the charged
sought a firearm enhancement. The defen- crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Utah
dant argued that the firearm enhancement Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1995) (requiring that
statute created a separate offense that the each "element of the offense charged" be
State had to plead as a separate crime, not as "proved beyond a reasonable doubt," includan enhancement. This court disagreed. See ing "[t]he conduct, attendant circumstances,
id at 994. In rejecting the claim of a sepa- and [t]he culpable mental state required.").
rate crime that had to be separately charged,
115 When the legislature passed the gang
we said: "When the matter is looked at enhancement provision, it acted just as it did
correctly and realistically, it is seen that when it passed the firearm enhancement prothere is but one criminal act charged, but vision: it mandated imposition of an enhancedescribing it accurately brings it within the ment only upon proof of elements over and
higher penalty prescribed by law: to-wit, an above those required for the cnme of lesser
aggravated assault which was committed consequence. In essence, it created a specifwith a firearm." Ji it 994 (footnote omit- ic new crime or a crime of a higher degree.
ted). Angus acknowledged that the legisla- As such, each of the elements must be
ture has the prerogative "to prescribe the proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Here,
punishment for crimes" and thereby may they were not. Therefore, we find the trial
"increase the degree of crime." Id. We said courts imposition of theftangenhancement to
that the legislature, by enacting the firearm have been in error.
enhancement, had increased the degree of
Il i' I 116 Finally, * e turn to Lupes s asthe crime by establishing a separate set of sertion that the gang enhancement statute
elements that, if proven, warranted a higher interferes with his right to a jury trial. He
punishment Importantly for present pur- argues that since the statute creates a sepaposes, we concluded in Angus that while the rate and new offense, each element must be
State did not need to separately charge the found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury,
enhancement as a crime, it did need to prove not the trial judge. We agree. The Utah
each element, including the defendant's use Constitution provides u(i]n criminal prosecuof a firearm, beyond a reasonable doubt be- tions the accused shall have the right ... to
cause the crime was increased as to degree have a speedy public trial by an impartial
by the presence of the firearm See id, at jury." Utah Const art I, § 12. In criminal
jury trials, questions of fact and the weight
of evidence are to be decided by the jury,
f 13 Returning to the present case, as both absent waiver. See Utah Code Ann. § 77a state and federal constitutional matter, we 17-10 (1995); State v. Green, 78 Utah 580,
conclude that due process requires that the 589-90, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (1931) ("It is the sole
prosecution prove every element of the and exclusive province of the jury to detercharged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt mine the facts in all criminal cases, whether
See Utah Const art I, § 7; U.S. Const the evidence offered by the state is weak or
amend. V, XIV; see also State v. Herrem* strong, is in conflict or is not controverted.").
895 P.2d 359, 368 (Utah 1995) ("due process
117 The gang enhancement statute, sec
mandates that the prosecution prove every tion 76-3-203.1(5X0, provides:
element of the charged crimes beyond a rea(c) The sentencing judge rather than the
sonable doubt"); State v. Smenson> 838 P.2d jury shall decide whether to impose the
1136, 1138 (Utah 1992) (holding that State
enhanced penalty under this section. The
has burden of proving all elements of a
imposition of the penalty is contingent
upon a finding by the sentencing judge
crime); State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah
that this section is applicable. In conjunc1981) ("A fundamental precept of our criminon with sentencing the court shall enter
nal la1* MI that (lie state must prove all
our decision in State v. Angits, 531 P.2d 992
(Utah 1978).
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written findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section.
This section of the enhancement statute directs the judge to become the fact finder,
expressly taking that power away from the
jury. In this case, the judge followed the
statute and became the fact finder. Even
though Lopes pled guilty to the underlying
offense, his plea did not establish the requisite mental state of the other actors, as is
necessary to support imposition of the gang
enhancement. His plea, then, did not establish all of the elements of the enhancement
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial
judge supplemented the plea by making the
factual finding that the elements of the gang
enhancement were established, and implemented the enhancement This clearly violated article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution because, absent waiver, only a jury has
the ability to determine when elements of a
crime are established beyond a reasonable
doubt Therefore, we find subsection (5)(c)
of § 76-3-203.1 of the Code unconstitutional.

ing unconstitutional provision] applies to the
construction of criminal statutes).
[10-121 119 To determine if a statute is
severable from its unconstitutional subsection, we look to legislative intent. If the
intent is not expressly stated, we then turn
to the statute itself, and examine the remaining constitutional portion of the statute in
relation to the stricken portion. If the remainder of the statute is operable and still
furthers the intended legislative purpose, the
statute will be allowed to stand. See Union
Trust Co. v. Simmons, 116 Utah 422, 429,
211 P.2d 190, 193 (1949), quoted in Steuvrt v.
Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n* 885 P.2d 759. 77980 (Utah 1994).

[13] 120 The criminal code contains a
separability clause, but it does not aid us in
this situation.6 Furthermore, since there is
no express intent on the severability question
in the gang enhancement statute, we examine the statute itself to determine if severing
section 76-3-203.1(5)(c) will destroy the purpose of the statute. A close reading of 76-3[8,9] 118 Having held subsection (5X0 203.1 indicates that severing subsection (5)(c)
unconstitutional we now determine if the will not make the objective of the statute
remainder of the gang enhancement statute unconstitutional.7 The statute imposes highcan remain in effect The general rule is er penalties if a person commits certain ofu
that statutes, where possible, are to be con- fenses "in concert with two or more persons.'*
strued so as to sustain their constitutionality. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(1X1995). It
Accordingly, if a portion of the statute might makes no difference in the application of the
be saved by severing the part that is uncon- statute or the satisfaction of its purposes if
stitutional, such should *be done.1* Celebrity the trial judge is the fact finder or if the
Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, questions of fact are left to the jury. We
657 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Utah 1982). This bask therefore find the remaining portion of the
rule applies to criminal and civil statutes gang enhancement statute constitutional.
equally. See State v. Nielsen, 19 Utah 2d 66,
69, 428 P.2d 13, 15 (1967) (court severed
121 We address the proper course of furunconstitutional section of criminal statute); ther proceedings in this case. We reverse
State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912, 917 (Utah Ct and remand for a new trial on the gang
App.1990) (holding that basic rule [of sever- enhancement charge. Our remand does not
6. Section 76-1-108 states: "If any provision of
this act, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of this act shall not be affected there*
by." Although we have never interpreted this
provision in the past, we now find that the only
purpose of this section is to preserve the entire
criminal code in case any one provision is declared unconstitutional. On its face, it does not
give any direction in this circumstance, where
we are trying to determine the severability of one
subsection from a larger section.

7. Section 76-3-203.2 of the Utah Code, which
imposes enhanced penalties for the use of dangerous weapons in offenses committed on school
premises, is almost identical in structure to the
gang enhancement statute. A key difference is
that section 76-3-203.2 does not include a section making the judge the fact finder in a particular case. It seems clear that holding subsection
(5Mc) of the gang enhancement statute invalid as
unconstitutional will not frustrate the legislative
purpose of the statute, as section 76-3-203 2
operates without making the trial judge the fact
finder.
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nlace the defendant in double jeopardy, bemuse the failure to prove an essential element of the gang enhancement charge was
trial error.'* See State v. Higginbotham*
917 P.2d 545, 550-51 (Utah 1996) (decision
was reversed and remanded due to failure to
prove an essential element of the charge). It
was not the fault of the prosecution that all
elements of the gang enhancement statute
were not satisfied. Until this decision, no
one had notice that the enhancement statute
requires proof of all elements beyond a reasonable doubt, or that this determination
could not be made by a judge absent a
waiver of the right to a jury trial. Therefore, the State should not be denied the right
to a fair adjudication because of double jeopardy. See State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342,
347 (Utah 1980) ('The state and the accused
share the right to a fair, error-free determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused, and the double jeopardy clause may
not deny either side that right").
122 We hold that the gang* enhancement
statute creates a new and separate offense
and, therefore, the Code requires each element of this crime be proved beyond a reasonable doubt Since the elements of the
crime were not established against Lopes,
either by his plea or by a jury trial, he was
deprived of his due process rights as guaranteed by the federal and Utah constitutions.
Furthermore, subsection (5Xc) of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203.1 is found to violate a defendants right to a jury trial as established in
the Constitution of the State of Utah. We
reverse and remand for a new trial on the
section 76-3-203.1 charge
123 Associate Chief Justice DURHAM
and Justice STEWART concur in Justice
ZIMMERMAN'S opinion.
RUSSON, Justice, dissenting:
124 I dissent In my opinion, the gang
enhancement statute is simply a sentencing
statute. It does not create a separate offense with a separate penalty, nor does it add
elements to the underlying offense. Rather,
it merely enhances the minimum sentence for
the underlying offense once the accused has
been found guilty of that offense; the maximum sentence remains the same regardless

of whether the enhancement applies. In
fact, the statute specifically states, "This section does not create any separate offense but
provides an enhanced penalty for the primary .offense." I Jtah Code Ann § 76-;*203.1(5Ka)(1995).
125 As a general principle, the legislature
has broad authority to define crimes and
corresponding punishments, and its decision
in this regard should not be proscribed unless it offends some fundamental principle of
justice. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477
U.S. 79, 85-86, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67
(1986); see also State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992.
994-95 (Utah 1978) ("It is the prerogative of
the legislature to prescribe the punishment
for crimes."). With respect to Utah's firearm and gang enhancement statutes, this
court has recognized and upheld the legislature's authority to require a trial judge to
enhance a defendant's statutory minimum
sentence if certain requirements are met
during the sentencing phase. See, e.g., State
v. Alvarez, 872 ?2d 450, 461 (Utah 1994)
(affirming trial court's imposition of enhanced minimum sentence under section 763-203.1 upon court's finding that defendant
committed underlying offense "in concert"
with others); Stats v. Deli 861 P.2d 431,
434-35 (Utah 1993) (affirming trial court's
imposition of enhanced minimum sentence
under section 76-3-203 for use of firearm
during commission of offense); Angus, 581
P.2d at 996 (same).
126 Notably, with respect to the firearm
enhancement statute, we have consistently
held that the statute does not create a separate, additional penalty for the underlying
offense; it merely "enhances" the minimum
sentence. For example, in Angus, after the
defendant had been convicted of aggravated
assault the trial court imposed an enhanced
minimum sentence pursuant to the firearm
enhancement statute. See 581 P.2d at 993.
Rejecting the defendant's argument that the
statute created a separate offense which
must be charged separately, we stated:
The punishment for a crime is not and
has never been considered a part of the
pleading charging a crime— After conviction, the penalty to be imposed is an
entirely separate proposition to be determined by the court as a matter of law on
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the basis of the penalty prescribed by the
statutes.
Angus, 581 P.2d at 995.
127 More recently, in Deli we affirmed a
firearm enhancement imposed after the defendant was convicted of a number of crimes,
including murder. Once again, we emphasized that the enhancement penalties of the
firearm enhancement statute are not separate sentences; instead, "the legislature intended the penalty for using a firearm in the
commission of a felony to simply increase' or
'enhance' the original sentence imposed, not
to stand alone as a separate sentence." Deli
861 P.2d at 434.
128 In Alvarez, we upheld an enhanced
penalty imposed pursuant to the gang enhancement statute, see 872 P.2d at 461-62;
however, in that case we did not address
whether section 76-3-203.1 creates a separate offense with a separate penalty. I
would hold that it does not Before a defendant is subject to an enhanced penalty under
either the firearm or the gang enhancement
statute, the defendant first must be convicted
of an underlying offense,1 Thereafter, the
sentencing judge must impose an 'Indeterminate" sentence prescribed by statute.2 While
the judge ordinarily has the power to suspend the defendant's sentence,3 under the
firearm and gang enhancement statutes the
judge must enhance the minimum sentence
for the underlying offense if certain requirements art met Thus, the gang enhancement statute operates in exactly the same

manner as the firearm enhancement statute—that is, it merely increases the minimum sentence which the legislature has prescribed for the underlying offense. It does
not affect the maximum sentence.
129 The majority opinion holds that the
"in concert'* requirement defined in section
76-3-203.1 creates a separate offense because it combines a separate mens rea—i.e.,
"in concert" mental culpability—with a criminal act This reasoning is flawed. While a
defendant may be charged with a crime and
held accountable as an accomplice under section 76-2-202/ the mere fact that a statute
may operate to impose criminal liability does
not preclude its use as a sentencing factor, so
long as its use in sentencing does not carry a
separate or additional penalty. Like the firearm enhancement statute, the gang enhancement statute does not impose an additional
or separate penalty upon the judge's finding
that the defendant would be criminally liable
under that statute; it simply enhances the
minimum sentence.
130 The mere fact that the statute requires the judge to make a certain finding
before imposing a sentence does not make
that finding an additional element of the
predicate offense. For instance, in connection with sentencing, a judge is called upon to
weigh aggravating and mitigating factors,
and those factors do not thereby become
additional elements of the underlying offense:
unless the Board, in its discretion, terminates or
commutes the punishment or pardons the offender".). Under section 77-27-9(l)(b) (Supp 1998).
the Board of Pardons and Parole may release an
offender before the minimum term has been
served if mitigating circumstances justify the release.

1. The underlying offenses are enumerated in
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(4) and include
crimes such as murder, rape, kidnapping, and
robbery.
2.

Under
Utah's
indeterminate
sentencing
scheme, the sentencing judge must impose a
sentence and judgment of imprisonment for an
indeterminate term "of not less than the minimum and not to exceed the maximum term provided by law for the particular crime/' Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-4(2). Unless otherwise expressly provided by law, every sentence "shall
continue until the maximum period has been
reached unless sooner terminated or commuted
by authority of the Board of Pardons and Parole." Id. § 77-18-4(3); see also Padtlla v.
Board of Pardons. 947 P.2d 664, 669 (Utah 1997)
("By its very term, the indeterminate' sentence
shall continue until the maximum period expires

3.

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1998).

4. See State v. Cornish, 560 P 2d It 34, 1136 (Utah
1977) (explaining that accomplice is one who
participates in crime in such a way that he could
be charged with same offense as the principal
defendant); State v. Murphy, 26 Utah 2d 330, 489
P2d 430. 431 (1971) (concluding that defendant
who drove co-defendant to store that was
robbed, waited in car with engine running, and
then drove co-defendant to another car one block
away after co-defendant had allegedly killed
store owner was "principal").

/
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[n all cases where an indeterminate sen<!33 The United States Supreme Court's
tence is imposed, the judge imposing the decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania 477
sentence may ... mail to the [Board of U.S. 79, 91, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67
Pardons and Parole] ... any information (1986), is instructive. That case involved a
he may have regarding the character of constitutional challenge to a Pennsylvania
the offender or any mitigating or aggrava- sentencing statute which provides that anyting circumstances connected with the of- one convicted of certain enumerated felonies
fense for which the offender has been con- is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence
victed.
of five years' imprisonment if the sentencing
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-13(5)(a) (Supp. judge finds, by a preponderance of the evi1998); see also ia\ § 76-3-201(6)(a) (Supp. dence, that the defendant "visibly possessed
1998) ("If a statute under which the defen- afirearm"during the commission of the ofdant was convicted mandates that one of fense. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81, 106 S.Ct.
three stated minimum terms shall be im- 2411. Recognizing that states have broad
posed, the court shall order imposition of the authority to define crimes and prescribe penterm of middle severity unless there are alties, the Court observed that
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of
the Pennsylvania Legislature has expressthe crime."); id § 76-3-201(6)(c) (Supp.
ly provided that visible possession of a
1998) ("In determining whether there are
firearm is not an element of the crimes
circumstances that justify imposition of the
enumerated in the mandatory sentencing
highest or lowest term, the court may considstatute ... but instead is a sentencing
er
statements in aggravation or mitigafactor that comes into play only after the
tion submitted by the prosecution or the
defendant has been found guilty of one of
defendant, and any further evidence introthose crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.
duced at the sentencing hearing/').
If III Furthermore, in considering the perti- Id at 85-86,106 S.Ct 2411.
134 In upholding the constitutionality of
nent sentencing factors, judges sometimes
must take into account the defendant's men- the Pennsylvania statute, the McMillan
tal state. For example, the Utah Code of Court reasoned that (1) the enhancement
Judicial Administration requires judges to implied no presumption of guilt, nor was the
"[cjonsider [the following] aggravating cir- prosecution relieved of its burden of proving
cumstances only if they are not an element of the defendant guilty of an enumerated ofthe offense
5. Offense was character- fense, see id. at 87, 106 S.Ct. 2411; (2) the
ized by extreme cruelty or depravity— I enhancement did not extend the period of
Offender's attitude is not conducive to super- incarceration beyond the terms provided for
vision in a less restrictive setting." Utah any of the enumerated felonies to which it
Code of Judicial Admin, app. C, at 1297 applied, nor did it create a separate offense
(1998); accord id. app. D, at 1368 (authoris- calling for a separate penalty, but rather
ing presentence investigator to consider merely limited the trial court's sentencing
whether crime was characterized by extreme discretion in selecting a penalty within the
cruelty or depravity); id at 1371 (same). range already available to it, see id at 87-88,
Thus, weighing the defendants state of mind 106 S.Ct 2411; (3) "[t]he statute [gave] no
is well within the realm of a sentencing impression of having been tailored to permit
judge's authority.
the visible possession finding to be a tail
U32 Moreover, acting with" "in concert* which wags the dog of the substantive ofmental culpability is not identified as an ele- fense," i.e., the argument that the enhancement of any of the enumerated felonies in the ment was really an element of the offense
gang enhancement statute. Set Utah Code lacked even superficial appeal because it did
Ann. § 76-3-203.1(4). In fact, under the not expose the defendant to greater or addistatute, a sentencing judge does not even tional punishment see id at 88, 106 S.Ct
inquire into the defendant's mental state un- 2411; and (4) the Pennsylvania legislature
til after the defendant has been duly convict- "did not change the definition of any existing
offense [but] simply took one factor that has
ed of an enumerated felony.
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always been considered by sentencing courts
to bear on punishment—the instrumentality
used in committing a violent felony—and dictated the precise weight to be given that
factor." Id. at 39-90, 106 S.Ct. 2411.
In conclusion, the Court stated:
Sentencing courts have traditionally heard
evidence and found facts without any prescribed burden of proof at all.
Sentencing courts necessarily consider
the circumstances of an offense in selecting
the appropriate punishment, and we have
consistently approved sentencing schemes
that mandate consideration of facts related
to the crime without suggesting that those
facts must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Id. at 91-92, 106 S.Ct. 2411 (citations omitted).
135 Under McMillan's reasoning, the
gang enhancement statute at hand is clearly
constitutional. First, the Utah Legislature
expressly chose to make group criminal activity a sentencing factor rather than a separate offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203.1(5Xa) ('This section does not create any
separate offense but provides an enhanced
penalty for the primary offense."). This is
clear not only from the language of the statute, but also because the statute does not
impose an additional, separate penalty to the
penalty for the underlying offense. Second,
the statute comes into play only after the
defendant has been duly convicted of violating one of the enumerated offenses in section
76-3-203.1(4). The statute implies no presumption of guilt, and the prosecution is not
relieved of its burden of proving each element of an enumerated felony. Third, the
statute does not expose the defendant to a
greater maximum term; it merely increases
the minimum sentence prescribed by statute
for the underlying offense. Thus, the statute
in no way operates as "a tail which wags the
dog of the substantive offense."9 McMillan,
3.

While Lopes does not question the reasoning
upholding the Pennsylvania statute in McMillan,
he asks this court to invalidate the gang enhancement statute, which actually makes it more
difficult for a judge to enhance a defendant's sentence. Under the Pennsylvania statute, the sentencing judge was merely required to make a

477 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 2411. Fourth, even
if the commission of an offense uin concert
with two or more persons" has not traditionally been a sentencing factor, that fact alone
should not limit the legislature's authority to
prescribe an enhanced penalty for such conduct. If the legislature has the authority to
determine that committing a crime while visibly possessing a firearm is a factor that
should be given precise weight during sentencing, it should also have the authority to
determine that committing a crime "in concert with two or more persons" justifies imposition of an enhanced minimum sentence if
certain requirements are met.5
136 Finally, I disagree with the majority's
description of the claimed constitutional right
allegedly impinged upon by the gang enhancement statute. The majority contends
that because the statute enhances the minimum sentence on the basis of findings concerning the defendant's mental culpability,
those findings somehow become additional
elements of a separate crime. As already
indicated, I disagree with this premise.
More disturbing, however, is that from this,
the majority extrapolates that under both the
state and the federal due process clauses, the
statute violates a criminal defendant's fundamental right to be presumed innocent until
each element of the offense is proven beyond
a reasonable doubt While criminal defendants certainly have a right to such a presumption of innocence, the majority identifies
no authority that this right is infringed when
a sentencing judge makes findings relevant
to sentencing without the state having to
prove those findings beyond a reasonable
doubt Without any articulated constitutional basis, the majority simply states that this
is required.
137 In sum, because the gang enhancement statute creates neither a separate
crime with a separate penalty nor an additional element to an underlying offense, I
factual finding diat the defendant visibly possessed a firearm. Under the gang enhancement
statute, the sentencing judge must make a factual
finding and must further determine that the defendant possessed the mental state required for
liability as an accomplice to the underlying offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202.
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would hold that Lopes was not denied any
fundamental rights. I would affirm.
<!38 Chief Justice HOWE concurs in Justice RUSSON'S dissenting opinion.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Leslie J. CALL, Defendant and Appellant

ceedings prior to that date, as probationer
had actual notice that his term of probation
would not expire <it conclusion of statutory
36-month
period.
FCA1953,
77-18l(12)(a)(i).
i, < nminal Law G>982.7
Probationer knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived his right to hearing on
issue of whether his probation should be
extended by signing waiver form that informed him of his right to appear and to be
represented by counsel, as defendant was
competent, read from, able to read form, and
had reasonable understanding of proceedings. U.C.AJ953, 77-18-l(12)(a)(i).

So 1MMM7
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 30, 1999.

The District Court, Salt Lake Division,
Frank G. Noel, J., revoked probationer's probation for violation occurring after probation
had been extended Probationer appealed.
The Court of Appeals certified case. The
Supreme Court, Howe, C.J., held that (1)
probation was properly extended by probationer's agreement to one-year extension and
waiver of personal appearance well before
expiration date, and (2) waiver was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.
Affirmed.

1. Criminal Law e»982.7
To extend probationary period beyond
its original term, State must take definitive
action to extend term before the expiration
date, and probationer must be given notice of
that intent U.C.A.1953,7M&-l(12)(a)(i).

Jan Graham, Att'y ben., Barnard N \Ud
sen, Asst Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff
Joan C. Watt, Scoti i
City, for defendant

\ llhinia, *iaJt I *ike

HOWE, Chief Justice:
11 Defendant Leslie J. Call appealed to
the Utah Court of Appeals from a district
court order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence of two concurrent prison terms. However, after oral
argument, but before rendering a decision,
the court of appeals certified it to us pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(3) and rule
43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

BACKGROUND

Probation IVM property extended by
probationer's agreement to one-year extension and waiver of personal appearance on
extension well before expiration date, even
though State did not initiate extension prr>

I * On November 15, 1991, Call pleaded
guilty to one count of burglary and one count
of attempted forcible sexual abuse, both third
degree felonies. The trial court sentenced
him to serve two concurrent terms of zero to
five years in prison but then suspended his
sentence and placed him on probation for a
period of three years. Although the court
orally sentenced Call on April 3, 1992, it did
not enter the written judgment and sentence
until April 8,1992. 1

1- The parties disagree on the date when Call's
probation began. Call asserts that it began on
A
pnl 3, 1992, the day the court orally sentenced
him. The State, however, relies on Stale v.

Anderson, 797 P 2d 1114 (Utah Ct.App 1990), to
argue that Call's probationary penod did not
begin until April 8, 1992, the day the court
signed and entered the written judgment.

2. Criminal Law <S»982.T
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RODWICKE YBARRA, 4184
Deputy District Attorney
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SALT LAKE J

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW & ORDER, RE: DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO BE AFFORDED A JURY
TRIAL ON CRIMINAL HOMICIDE
CHARGE

CAMERON T. LOPES,
Defendant

Case No. 961900885 FS
Hon. Dennis M. Fuchs

WHEREAS the above-styled case came on for hearing on 29 November 1999 at 8:30
a.m., on the defendant's motion to be afforded a jury trial on the criminal homicide charge; the
defendant being present and represented by his attorney, Mr. Michael A. Peterson, Salt Lake
Legal Defender's Association; the state being represented by its attorney, Mr. Rodwicke Ybarra,
Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County; the court having previously read the defendant's
memorandum and the transcript of the change of plea hearing occurring on 7 August 1996; the
court having received and carefully considered the arguments of the parties; and otherwise being
fully informed in the premises;
NOW THEREFORE, the court makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The defendant entered separate pleas to the criminal homicide charge, to the gang

enhancement and to the gun enhancement at the change of plea hearing on 7 August 1996.
2.

The defendant's conditional Sery plea was only as to the gang enhancement.

00343

ORDER, RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO BE AFFORDED A JURY TRIAL ON
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE CHARGE
Case No. 961900885 FS
Page 2

3.

During the plea colloquy on 7 August 1999, Judge Peuler made it very

understandable to the defendant that one possible effect of a successful appeal of her ruling on
the constitutionality of the gang enhancement would be that he might not be able to withdraw his
guilty plea to the criminal homicide charge, but rather only have his sentence adjusted.
4.

The remand from the Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Lopes, ordered only that the

defendant be allowed "a new trial on the section 76-3-203.1 charge."
5.

Upon remand, the state moved to dismiss the gang enhancement consistent with

its stated agreement at the change of plea hearing.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The defendant was informed prior to his entry of plea to the murder charge and

gun enhancement of the possible consequence that should he prevail on his appeal of the
consitutionality of the gang enhancement he might not be entitled to withdraw his plea to the
murder charge but only have his sentence modified.
2.

In accordance with the order of the Utah Supreme Court, the defendant is only

entitled to a trial on the §76-3-203.1 (gang enhancement) charge, not on the criminal homicide
charge with gun enhancement.
ORDER
1.

Based upon the State's motion, the gang enhancement, §76-3-203.1, is hereby

ordered dismissed
2.

The defendant's sentence shall be modified to delete that portion attributable to

the gang enhancement, §76-3-203.1.
3.

The defendant's motion for a trial on the criminal homicide, murder charge is

hereby denied.

°0344

ORDER, RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO BE AFFORDED A JURY TRIAL ON
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE CHARGE
Case No. 961900885 FS
Page 3

DATED this /J

day of • r/fa~CS^, 2000.
BY THE COURT:

' **& '^r ~<^£ -^-^DENNIS M. FUCHS, District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order, Re: Defendant's
Motion To Be Afforded A Jury Trial On Criminal Homicide Charge was delivered to Michael A.
Peterson, Attorney for Defendant CAMERON T. LOPES, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111 on the vj^day of January, 2000.
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13

it's a foregone conclusion win on "as -a-party".
cannot have the two coincide.

You

It's a logical

impossibility.
THE COURT:

The Court is going to deny your

motion for the following reasons.
One, I think during the plea colloquy -- I
think that Judge Peuler made it very understandable to
Mr. Lopes -- if I mispronounce that, I apologize -that his appeal of the gang enhancement could be
overturned but, under the worst case scenario, it
wouldn't affect his pleas on the other charges, being
the homicide and being the gun enhancement.
And, in fact, I think she was very specific.
Again, at your request Mr. Peterson.

In reading

the -- the transcript, that she took a plea to each
separately.
I don't think there's any question but it
was a knowing and intelligent plea entered to the
homicide.

There was a knowing, intelligent plea to

the gun enhancement.

And there was a Serv plea

entered in regard to the gang enhancement.
In reading the case from the Supreme Court
in reversing and remanding, the argument was he had to
be tried on the new enhancement or on the enhancement.
I agree with you that if the State agreed to go

00346

- Colloquy -

14

forward on the enhancement, it would probably have to
be a trial on more than the one charge.

However, I

think the State is willing to and they have been -they have dismissed the enhancement.

They don't plan

on pursuing the enhancement, and I don't think there
is anything in the order of the Supreme Court that
requires Mr. Lopes to be allowed to withdraw all of
the pleas and go back to trial on the homicide either.
If that was their intent, they will have to
make it a lot more clear than they did in their
decision in this case.

You will have to go back up

there.
So, I think that his plea was knowing and
voluntary.
|

I am not saying it's not timely.

| buying that argument.

I'm not

I think ha has been back

--as

soon as tha decision was rendered, he has been back in
regards to tha gang anhancamant.
So, for those reasons, I am denying your
motion.

I think his plea was knowingly and

-intelligently made.

I don't think tha Supreme Court

decision requires that ha be given a new trial on all
charges.

I think tha State is dismissing the gang

enhancement or has dismissed the gang enhancement and
I think tha only thing Mr. Lopes is entitled to is --

o. r, 9 A 7

- Colloquy -

15

I don't even know if Judge Peuler resentenced him or
not.
MR. YBARRA:
THE COURT:

I don't believe she has.
I think he might be entitled to a

modification to the sentence accordingly striking the
gang enhancement.

And I would do that unless you

would request a hearing in regards to sentencing.
Again, the Court would just go ahead and issue a
modified commitment striking the consecutive gang
enhancement•
And also in regard to the party to the ,
offense, the Supreme Court has not ruled the language
in criminal statutes which provide for one to be
guilty to -- as a party to the offense, they have not
said that is unconstitutional and, in fact, that has
been challenged and held many times.
Do you have need for any clarification?
MR. PETERSON:

Judge, we don't -- we don't

need a separate hearing for additional sentencing.
would, however, need a new commitment
THE COURT:

We

order.

We will give a new commitment

striking the consecutive gang enhancement language.
MR. PETERSON:

I want to make crystal clear

that the State has, in fact, dismissed the gang
enhancement provisions on Mr. Lopes.

n ft 9 A Q
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APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff

RODWICKE YB ARRA
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
3522 South 700 West
West Valley City, Utah 84119

For the Defendant:

KIMBERL Y A. CLARK
LEGAL DEFENDERS
424 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
* * *

1

August 7, 1996
HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER PRESIDING

2

P R O C E E D I N G S

3
4

THE COURT:

The matter before the Court is State

5

of Utah versus Cameron Lopes.

6

however, Case Nos. 961900816 and 0885.

7

the record that both counsel are present, all three counsel

8

are present, excuse me, and Mr. Lopes is also present this

9

morning.

There are two case numbers,
I'll indicate for

10

What's anticipated then Mr. Peterson?

11

MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, we' 11 have a change of

12

plea in the case ending 0885.

13

dismiss 0816, pending before you, and we 911 have a motion

14

to dismiss two cases before Judge Noe!L, 961900547 /

15

961900546,.this Friday.

16
17

THE COURT:

Do you need him to repeat those case

numbers, Kathy?

18

KATHY: No.

19

THE COURT: Okay.

20

MR. YBARRA:

21

The motion by the State to

That is the State 's understanding,

your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.

22

Let me ask some questions

First of all, Mr. Peterson and Ms . Clark, I don't

23

then.

24

know who is going to proceed, but has

25

defendant been prepared then?

a istatement

of

1

1

MR. PETERSON:

Yes, Judge.

2

THE COURT: All right. And have either one or

3

both of you had an opportunity to go over the contents of

4

that statement with Mr. Lopes in a manner that you believe

5

is sufficient for him to understand the contents of that

6

statement?

7

MR. PETERSON:

8

THE COURT: And do you also believe, based upon

9
10

Yes, I have, Judge.

your conversations with Mr. Lopes, that he understands his
constitutional rights?

11

MR. PETERSON:

12

THE COURT: Mr. Lopes, let me ask you some

13

questions.

14

Lopes?

I do-

First of all, is your correct name Cameron

15

MR. LOPES: Yes.

16

THE COURT: And do you have a middle name, Mr.

17

Lopes?

18

MR. LOPES: Thomas.

19

THE COURT:

Thomas?

20

MR. LOPES:

Yup, Yes.

21

THE COURT:

What is your date of birth, Mr,

23

MR. LOPES:

4/29/76.

24 J

THE COURT: Mr. Lopes, the statement of defendant

22

25

Lopes?

that your attorney prepared is in front of him and it's
2

1

also in front of you at this time.

2

opportunity to read or have someone read it to you?

Did you have an

3

MR. LOPES:

Yes.

4

THE COURT:

Tell me what happened.

5

Did you read

it or did someone read it to you or with you?

6

MR. LOPES: My lawyer read it with me.

7

THE COURT: All right.

8
9

that you didn't have to read it yourself?
MR. LOPES: Yes.

10
11

Did he read it to you so

THE COURT: All right.

Did you understand what

he read to you?

12

MR. LOPES: Yes.

13

THE COURT:

Did you have a sufficient opportunity

14

to ask him any questions about anything that was in that

15

statement?

16

MR. LOPES: Yes.

17

THE COURT: And did he answer all of your

18

questions for you?

19

MR. LOPES: Yes.

20

THE COURT: All right.

So, as you stand before

21

me now, in looking at the statement of defendant's that's

22

in front of you, you can tell me that you understand

23

everything that's in there.

24

MR. LOPES: Yes.

25

THE COURT:

Is that correct?
3

1

MR. LOPES:

2

THE COURT: All right. Are you presently under

3

Yes.

the influence of any alcohol or drugs, Mr. Lopes?

4

MR. LOPES: No.

5

THE COURT: When's the last time you had any

6

alcohol?

7

MR. LOPES:

A long time.

8

THE COURT:

Not within the past several days

9

while you've been in custody?

10

MR. LOPES:

No.

11

THE COURT:

All right.

When is the last time you

12

had a controlled substance, controlled substance either

13

prescribed or otherwi se.

14

MR. LOPES:

Not within the last days.

15

THE COURT:

How long have you been in custody?

16

MR. LOPES:

Six months.

17

THE COURT:

Have you had any controlled

18

substances while you' ve been in custody?

19

MR. LOPES:

No.

20

THE COURT:

Not even prescriptive medication?

21

MR. LOPES:

No.

22

THE COURT:

All right.

23

And are you thinking

clearly today?

24

MR. LOPES:

Yes.

25

THE COURT:

Do you understand what you are doing
4

1

here today and what these proceedings are fc>r?

2

MR. LOPES:

Yeah/ yes.

3

THE COURT:

And do you understand that if you

4

sign the statement o f defendant that you' ve gone over wi th

5

your attorney. by doing so you'll be telling me 1that

6

everything in that s tatement is accurate.

7

MR. LOPES:

8

THE COURT: Are you going to sign it voluntarily

9

today?

Yes.

Is that a decision that you have made on your own?

10

MR. LOPES: Yes.

11

THE COURT: All right*

You may go ahead and sign

12

it at this time and I'll receive it. Are you right handed

13

or left handed, Mr. Lopes?

14

MR. LOPES:

15

MR. YBARRA:

16

MR. PETERSON:

17

22

Yes,

this is the one we went over

THE COURT: And I'll indicate that Mr. Lopes has
signed the document in open Court.

20
21

Mike, did I already sign that?

last time.

18
19

Right.

Mr. Peterson/ may I have a factual basis for the
plea?
MR. PETERSON:

Yes, your Honor.

Judge, in terms

23

of the elements, in Salt Lake County, Mr. Lopes will be

24

pleading guilty to acting as a party to an offense and

25

under circumstances evidencing an depraved indifference to
5

human life, he engaged in conduct which created a great
risk of death to another and, in fact, said conduct did
cause the death of Joey Mierra.
Factually, at 918 South Navajo Street in Salt
Lake County, on February 22, 1996, Mr. Lopes was present on
the porch of a house at roughly six in the morning.

He was

there with at least one other companion by the name of
Miguel Florez and at that time Miguel Florez used a shotgun
to shoot and kill Joey Mierra.

Mr. Lopes aided Mr. Florez

in this shooting in that Mr. Lopes was present on the porch
and was armed with a shotgun at that time Mr. Florez shot
Mr. Mierra.
THE COURT: Mr. Ybarra, do you wish to add
anything to that factual basis?
MR. YBARRA: Just simply to add that the defendant
actually acted in concert with the, I believe, two other
persons.

That would be Colin Carter and Miguel Florez

making a total of three people that were on the porch. And
for the record, Mr. Carter has already plead guilty to this
very offense.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Lopes, is that actually what you did?
MR. LOPES: Yes.
THE COURT:

All right.

I'll receive the

statement of defendant at this time.
6

1

And Mr. Lopes, let me ask you some additional

2

questions and these questions relate to your constitutional

3

rights. And you've had a little opportunity to discuss

4

them with your attorney, but I also want to make sure

5

before I accept any plea from you that you understand them.

6

If I say anything that you don't understand, will you let

7

me know?

8

MR. LOPES: Yes.

9

THE COURT:

First of all, you understand, do you

10

not, that you have the right to proceed to trial;

that

11

you're not required to enter a guilty plea to this charge

12

or any charge?

Do you understand that?

13

MR. LOPES: Yes.

14

THE COURT:

Do you understand that if you proceed

15

to trial you're presumed to be innocent?

What that means

16

is that you cannot be convicted unless the State is able to

17

prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of this

18

defense.

Do you understand that?

19

MR. LOPES: Yes.

20

THE COURT:

Specifically, let me go over with you

21

the elements that the State would be required to prove.

22

And let me just ask Mr. Ybarra, with regard to the elements

23

would the State be proceeding on the depraved indifference

24

to human life element or —

25

MR. YBARRA:

Were we to proceed to trial, your
7

Honor, we would proceed on all —
THE COURT:
MR. YBARRA:

All three.
—

the alleged theories including

the intentional.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

The elements then, Mr. Lopes, that the State
would be required to prove if you were to proceed to trial
would be as follows:

That at 918 South Navajo in Salt

Lake County, on or about— I can't read this, it's
handwritten.

Is it December 2?

MR. YBARRA:
THE COURT:

February 22nd, your Honor.
Sorry, February 22, 1996, that you as

- a party to the offense, did one of the following:
intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Joey Mierra
and/or intending to cause serious bodily injury to another,
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that
caused the death of Joey Mierra and/or acting under
circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to human
life engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death
to another and thereby caused the death of Joey Mierra.
Do you understand all of those elements that the
State would be required to prove?
MR. LOPES: Yes.
THE COURT:

All right.

Do you understand that

you would have the right to a jury trial and the only way
8

1

that you could be convicted is if all of the jurors agreed

2

that the State had met this burden of proof?

3

MR. LOPES: Yes.

4

THE COURT:

Do you understand that at the time of

5

trial that you would have the right to see the witnesses

6

face to face who would testify against you and you'd have

7

the right to have your attorney cross-examine them on your

8

behalf?

9
10

MR. LOPES: Yes.
THE COURT:

Do you understand that you'd be

11

allowed to present any evidence that you would like to have

12

the jury receive at the time of trial including your own

13

right to testify, if you chose to do that.

14

understand that?

15

MR. LOPES: Yes.

16

THE COURT:

Do you

Do you also understand that whether

17

or not you testify is a voluntary choice that you could

18

make and if you decided that you did not want to testify at

19

the time of trial, no one could hold that against you or

20

draw any negative conclusions from that fact. Do you

21

understand that?

22

MR. LOPES: Yes.

23

THE COURT:

Do you also understand that if you

24

were convicted following a jury trial that you would have

25

the right to appeal that conviction to an appellate court?
9

1

MR. LOPES: Yes.

2

THE COURT:

All right.

I understand that your

3

attorney has discussed with you appealing a pretrial ruling

4

that I have made and certainly my understanding is that

5

this guilty plea today will not affect that right but by

6

entering a guilty plea today you give up many other rights

7

of appeal that you would otherwise have.

8

that?

9
10
11

MR. LOPES: Yes.
THE COURT:

Do you want me to clarify that or

explain that any further to you irt terms of those rights?

12

MR. LOPES: No.

13

THE COURT:

14

Do you understand

All right.

Are you entering a guilty

plea today because you are actually guilty of this offense?

15

MR. LOPES:

Yup, Yes.

16

THE COURT:

Do you understand that this offense

17

is charged as a first degree felony.

It carries with it

18

certain maximum punishments that I would like to go over

19

with you so that I can make sure that you understand them.

20

First of all, a first degree felony is punishable by a

21

maximum prison term of not less than five years and that

22

could be up to life.

23

fine of $10,000.

24

felony but it carries with it certain enhancements.

25

first is a gang enhancement.

That carries with it also a maximum

This offense is not only a first degree
The

What that does is it adds a
10

possible additional four years to the minimum five year
prison term.

So that what you would be looking at on the

first degree felony with the gang enhancement would be a
possible prison term of nine years up to life.

Do you

understand that?
MR. LOPES: Yup, yes.
THE COURT:

It also carries with it a gun

enhancement and what that does is add additional, can add
additional time to your sentence.

For a first degree

felony which is in this case, the Court, as I read the
statute is required, if I find that a gun was used or a
facsimile of a gun, I'm required to add at least one year
consecutive, that means this year is served after your
first sentence, to the underlying sentence and I have the
discretion to add an additional term of zero to five years.
Does that make sense to you?
MR. LOPES. Yes.
THE COURT: All right.
Counsel, do you want to, either one of you want
to clarify what I've said or explain it any better?
MR. PETERSON:

I don't believe so, Judge.

THE COURT: Mr. Ybarra?
MR. YBARRA:

Simply to clarify the fact that the

additional one year on the gun enhancements may be served
concurrently with the four years on the gang enhancements.
11

1

Is that everyone's understanding?

2

MR. PETERSON:

3

THE COURT:

Yes.

The statute says if the trior of fact

4

finds a dangerous weapon of facsimile or representation was

5

used, the Court shall additional sentence the person

6

convicted for a term of one year to one consecutively and

7

not currently.

8
9

MR. YBARRA:

So, it's consecutive to the basic

sentence.

10

THE COURT:

And the Court may additionally

11

sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not

12

to exceed five years to run consecutively and concurrently.

13

And the way I understand that is that I have an option if I

14

choose to do so to add a consecutive one year term to the

15

underlying sentence or in the alternative I may add a zero

16

to five term to the underlying sentence.

17

MR. YBARRA:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. YBARRA:

Yes.
Is that consistent with your?
It is, your Honor.

I think the

20

point that I was trying to make is that the although the

21

enhancements maybe required to be consecutive to the basic

22

sentence of five to life, they may be concurrent with

23

other.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. YBARRA:

Oh, yes.
That was (inaudible).
12

1

THE COURT:

I believe you're right about that and

2

I also believe that it's a fair interpretation of both of

3

these statutes that I've just referred to that they are not

4

required to be imposed by the Court.

5

believe that those are both things that I can consider at

6

the time of sentencing.

7

MR. PETERSON:

8

THE COURT: And they may be added but that's

9

discretionary.

In other words, I

That's our position, your Honor.

Does everybody concur with that?

10

MR. PETERSON:

We believe that to be true.

11

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lopes, the purpose of

12

my going through these with you though is so that you can

13

understand the worse case scenario.

14

what the maximum penalty is that is possible under this

15

plea agreement.

16

I've gone over with you?

So that you understand

Do you understand the maximum penalty that

17

MR. LOPES: Yes.

18

THE COURT: All right.

Do you understand that at

19

the time of sentencing your attorneys or the attorney

20

representing the State will probably make certain

21

recommendations to me that they'd like to have me follow.

22

Do you understand that I'm not required to follow those

23

recommendations at the time of sentencing?

24

MR. LOPES: Yes.

25

THE COURT:

Has anyone promised you anything in
13

1

return for this guilty plea other than the plea agreement

2

that's part of the record today?

3

MR. LOPES: No.

4

THE COURT:

5

Has anybody threatened or coerced you

in any manner to get you to enter a guilty plea today?

6

MR. LOPES: No.

7

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with your

8

representation that you've received from your attorneys?

9

MR. LOPES: Yes.

10

THE COURT: All right.

Now I understand that

11

this plea today is in the nature of what we call a Ceri

12

plea.

13

MR. PETERSON:

14

THE COURT:

15
16

That's true, Judge.

Have you gone over that kind of a

plea agreement with your attorney, Mr. Lopes.
MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, for the record, I've

17

explained to Mr. Lopes that we will be potentially

18

appealing the Court's application of a minimum mandatory

19

gang enhancement sentence in this case based on your

20

previous legal ruling where we asked the Court to declare

21

the gang enhancement statute unconstitutional.

22

Lopes understands we will be pursuing that appeal even

23

after the time he is sentenced in this case.

24

Is that true?

25

MR. LOPES: Yes.

And Mr.

14

THE COURT:

All right.

Do you understand that

when you enter a guilty plea today, I will go ahead and if
I find it appropriate, receive your guilty plea and then I
will go ahead and sentence you.

If your attorney and you

decide to appeal the pretrial ruling and you prevail on
appeal, that is the appellate court decides that I was
wrong, and the gang enhancement statute is unconstitutional
then you would be allowed to withdraw your guilty plea.
However, if you appeal and you loose, and the
appellate court says that I was right, then you're stuck,
basically.

You can't ask the Court to let you withdraw

your guilty plea.
be permanent.

In other words, what you do today would

Did I make a mis-statement?

MR. YBARRA:

Your Honor, I believe that if the

appeal's court finds that the gang enhancement is not
constitutional, it would simply, it would be a modification
of his sentence.

It wouldn't be an admission to allow him

to withdraw his guilty plea.
THE COURT:
MR. YBARRA:

Okay.
We'd simply strike that part of the

sentence.
THE COURT:

Is that your understanding?

MR. PETERSON:

Well, that's not clear.

Unfortunately under Gibbons it's unclear whether it would
invalidate, inviciate the whole plea and whether we would
15

1

have to re-enter a five to live plea or not, but Mr. Ybarra

2

may be correct.

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

I think Mr. Lopes ought to

4

understand what's possible under a worse case scenario so I

5

believe that it's possible under a reading of the case on

6

Mr. Lopez that if the appellate court says that I was wrong

7

on the gang enhancement statute that you may not be able to

8

withdraw your guilty, you may simply have your sentence

9

adjusted.

Now, I understand that there may also be a

10

possibility that you could withdraw your guilty plea at

11

that time but I'm not certain about that and I don't know

12

if anybody is at this point.

13

MR. PETERSON:

14

THE COURT:

15

We're not, Judge.

Okay.

So you understand that

possibility?

16

MR. LOPES: Yes.

17

THE COURT:

All right.

Do you have any other

18

questions that you want to ask your attorney or the Court

19

before we go any further, Mr. Lopes?

20

MR. LOPES: No.

21

THE COURT:

Counsel, is there anything further

22

that you would have me inquire of Mr. Lopes before we go

23

any further?

24

MR. PETERSON:

I don't have anything, your Honor.

25

MR. YBARRA: I don't believe so, Judge.
16

1

THE COURT:

All right.

Now, Mr. Lopes, I'll ask

2

you to enter your plea at this time. And I'll go through

3

the information and the enhancements with you.

4

in case number 961900885 is as follows: In count 1:

5

Criminal homicide murder.

6

South Navajo in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or

7

about February 22, 1996, in violation of Title 76, Chapter

8

5, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in

9

that the defendant, Cameron Lopes, as a party to the

The charge

A first degree felony.

At 918

10

offense, intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Joey

11

Mierra and/or said defendant intending to cause serious

12

bodily to another, committed an act clearly dangerous to

13

human life that caused the death of Joey Mierra and/or said

14

defendant, acting under circumstances evidencing depraved

15

indifference to human life, engaged in conduct which

16

created a great risk of death to another and thereby caused

17

the death of Joey Mierra.

18

With notice given pursuant to Utah Code Annotated

19

76-302-203.1 that the defendant is subject to an enhanced

20

penalty as provided in that section because the above

21

offense was committed in concert with two or more persons,

22

further by firearm of a facsimile of a firearm or the

23

representation of a firearm was used in the commission or

24

furtherance of the murder giving rise to enhanced penalties

25

as provided by § 76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as
17

amended.

To the charge, Mr. Lopes, as I've announced, how

do you plead, sir?
MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, could you take that a

piece at a time if you don't mind.

Because I've got to

preserve Ceri exactly.
THE COURT: All right, as
MR. PETERSON:

Well —

~

I'm sorry, go ahead.

THE COURT: As to Count One, criminal homicide
murder, a first degree felony, Mr. Mierra, excuse me, Mr.
Lopes, having caused the death of Mr. Mierra.

How do you

plead, sir?
MR. LOPES:

I plead guilty to the last

alternative, under the last alternative.
THE COURT: As to evidencing depraved
indifference to human life that you engaged in conduct
which created a grave risk of death of another and thereby
caused the death of Joey Mierra?
MR. LOPES: Yes.
THE COURT: All right.

I do find, Mr. Lopes,

that your plea is knowingly and voluntarily made.

I'll

therefore receive it and enter it as a conviction at this
time.
As to the other two portions of that, Mr.
Peterson, how do you wish to proceed?
MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, we wish to enter Ceri
18

1

plea relative to the gang enhancement provision under 7 6-3-

2

203,1.

3

advise Cameron Lopes to say guilty under State vs. Ceri

4

because we are specifically meaning to appeal the Court's

5

ruling on the constitutionality of the gang enhancement

6

provision. Again, our problem is, Judge, that the

7

legislature has taken a fact finding out of the hands of

8

the jury and submitted it to the Court unconstitutionally.

9

THE COURT: All right. As to the gang

If you want to inquire about this plea, I would

10

enhancement statute found at 76-3-203.1, as to that

11

enhancement, Mr. Lopes, how do you plead?

12

MR. LOPES: Guilty under State versus Ceri.

13

THE COURT: All right. And as to the firearm

14

enhancement, Mr. Lopes, how do you plead?

15

MR. LOPES: Guilty as a party to the offense.

16

THE COURT: All right.

I do find that your plea

17

of guilty to all of the above is knowingly and voluntarily

18

made.

19

time.

20

I'll, therefore, enter them as a conviction at this

Let me tell you about two additional rights that

21

you have, Mr. Lopez.

The first is the right to ask the

22

Court to let you withdraw your guilty plea if you have good

23

cause. Any motion that you make to do so, however, has to

24

be filed within thirty days of today's date. Do you

25

understand that?
19

1

MR. LOPES: Yes.

2

THE COURT:

And you also have the right to be

3

sentenced in no less than two days from today's date, no

4

more than forty-five days from today's date.

5

to be sentenced within that time period?

6

MR. LOPES:

Within two days?

7

THE COURT:

No.

8

Do you wish

The time period begins running

two days from now, goes up to forty-five days.

9

MR. LOPES: Yes.

10

THE COURT:

All right.

I believe a pre-sentence

11

report is appropriate in this case.

12

anything that I need to ask AP&P to address specifically?

13

MR. PETERSON:

14

MR. YBARRA:

15

Counsel, is there

I don't believe so, Judge.
I don't know of anything, your

Honor.

16

THE COURT: All right.

I'll ask AP&P to prepare

17

a presentence report then and I'll set the matter over for

18

sentencing.

19

Kathy, we've talked about trying to find another

20

Wednesday in about 45 days.

21

would be?

Can you look and see when that

22

Let me ask counsel, the 45 day period would run

23

on the 25th of September, would you have any objection to

24

us looking at something in the next week after that?

25

MR. PETERSON:

No, your Honor.
20

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. PETERSON: No, we wouldn't because we'll

3

I'm going to be gone that week.

< event.
anticipate credit for time served in any

THE COURT: All right,• Mr. Lopes, are you

4
5

willing to waive the maximum time for sentencing so that I

6

can look at that next week and see what my schdule looks

7

like?

MR. PETERSON: His concern/ Judge, is that he'd

8
9

like to get sentenced as soon as possible and be on his way

10

to the prison.

11

far.

12
13

He has had a very difficult in the jail so

THE COURT:

Do you want me to look at some other

time before the 25th of September?

14

MR. PETERSON:

15

THE COURT:

16
17

If it's possible.

I don't know that the pre-sentence

report will be done but we can certainly try for that.
MR. PETERSON:

All right.

But I think it

18

probably will, Judge. As far as I know Cameron Lopes has

19

two prior offenses and they're misdemeanors.

20
21
22
23

THE CLERK:

We could do is September 24th.

It's

a Tuesday either nine or nine thirty.
MR. PETERSON:

That'd be fine.

I can come over

on a role call calendar.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. YBARRA:

Can you do that also, Mr. Ybarra?
I'm sure we can.
21

1

THE COURT:

All right.

2

then for September 24th.

3

9:30?

5

What time do you want it, nine or

Later?
MR. PETERSON:

4

We'll set the sentencing

Nine actually would be good for

us.

6

THE COURT:

Nine?

Okay.

September 24 at 9:00

7 i a.m.
8
9
10

And Mr. Ybarra, will you please give notice to
the family members of Mr. Mierra who may wish to be present
at that time?

11

MR. YBERRA:

12

THE COURT:

13

Is there anything else that we need to address

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

I will, your Honor.
Thank you.

today?
MS. CLARK:

Your Honor, did you notify him that

he has a withdraw his plea?
THE COURT:

I didn't hear that part?

I did, within the thirty day period,

I believe I did.
MR. PETERSON:

The last thing we have to address

is the dismissal of the compansion case.
THE COURT:

Thank you. Appreciate that.

I will

22

grant the State's motion to dismiss Case number 961900816

23

and the two additional cases that you mentioned earlier

24

which I believe are assigned to Judge Noel.

25

MR. PETERSON:

Thank you, Judge.
22

THE COURT:

Anything else?

MR. PETERSON:
special sidings for me.

No, your Honor, we appreciate the
Thank you.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.)

23
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the defendant in this case and hereby

acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea of/guilty), (no contest) to the following crime(s):
CRIME & STATUTORY PROVISION
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(min/max)
and/or
Minimum/Mandatory

f°

4*
h-M • (JIG
urder

-£>-*)?>

*4~ ftavj \

$»

c^o\

B.

c.

-^

CAROLS

^(il^OOSMI

^

a/.^cuA

A
i

<•*

A

#%

>•

^

A

I have received a copy of the (charge) (information) against me, I have read it, and I
understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading (guilty) (no
contest).
The elements of the crime(s) of w hj^jl ^$*$ffi£

are as

follows:

ITn

c

*t ( 1

^__

A

My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable, that
constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charges are as follows:

WAS

4T
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I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and understanding of the
following facts:
1.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot

afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at ao cost to me. I recognize that a
condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as determined by the court,
to recoup the cost of counsel if so appointed for me.
2.

I ,(nave not)) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to

0 C0i C 4

counsel, I have done so knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons:

3.

If I have waived myrightto counsel, I have read this statement and understand

the nature and elements of the charges, mv niiiu'i. in in is and other proceedings and the
consequences of my plea of guilty.

fa
4.

If I have not waived myrightto counsel, my attorneys

(fad {CwilniL ( l i v ^

i r Qi
facfall

fiUc^^

_, and I have had an'opportunity to discuss this statement,

my rights and the consequer ices of my guilty plea with my attorney.
5.

I know that I have arightto a trial by jury.

6.

I know i hat if I wish to have a trial I have therightto confront and cross-examine

witnesses against me-or to have them cross-examined by rnv attorney
the ngni

1 rdso know that I have

compel my witness(es) by subpoena at State expense to testify in court upon my

behalf.
7.

I know that I have arightto testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to do

so I can not be compelled to testify or give evScience against myself and no advene inferences
will be drawn against me if I do not testify.
8.

I know that, if I w i sti to contest the charge against me I need only plead "not

guilty" and the matter will be set for trial. At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden
of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury
the verdict must be unanimous.

0 G 0 10 *

9.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted bv

a jury or by the judge that I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the
Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I could not afford
to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State.
10.

I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to which I

^'—^

plead/(guilm (no contest). I know that by pleading tfguiltyj/no contest) to an offense that

Kj^y^

^—^

carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting myself to serving a minimum
mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the sentences may be consecutive and may be
for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to a fine an eighty-five percent (85 %)
surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 63-63a-4, will be imposed. I also know that I may
be ordered by the court to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes.
U.

I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for

additional amounts, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on
probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or
to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences
being imposed upon me.
12,

I know and understand that by pleadmg/tguiky$ (no contest) I am waiving my

statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by
entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the conduct alleged
and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my piea(s) is/are entered.
13.

My piea(s) d^i(guil#f(no contesty(is)ps not) the result of a plea bargain between

myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this plea bargain,
if any, are fully contained in

ft8^ff^fo^

this affidavit.
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14.

I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea(s) of-(guilty), (no

contest i I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my plea.
15.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of probation

or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that
any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the court may do are also not binding
on the court.
16.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence -n-t" my kind imc been made to induce

me to plead guilty, and no promises except, those contained herein and in the attached plea
agreement, have been made to me.
17.

I have read this statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney and I

understand its provisions. I know that 1 am free to change or delete anything contained in this
statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are uinrct,
18...

I am satisfied «- «ih the .kiwie and assistance of my attorney.

19. • I am 2C?

yean of age; I have attended school through the

''' >Y ' grade and

I can read and understand the English language or an interpreter has been provided to me. I was
not under the influence of any drugs, medicatioa or intoxicants which would Impair my judgment
when the decision was made to enter the plea(s). I am not presently under the influence of any
drug, medication or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
20.

I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of

understanding the proceedings and the consequences if my plea and free of any mental disease,
defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
entering my plea.

0 0 010?

DATED this

S

day of / tb.tit f

. . &

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY

\Ct

V*L**~

Tcertify that^rm the attorney for

(_/)\Ais^^\

hpao
m~]

, the

we
defendant above, and tha^know^e/ihe has read the statement or thatjrhave read it to (mri/her
and/Fhave discussed it with/tiir^/her and believe thairfie/^he fully understands the meaning of
its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of prfknowledge and belief
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the
defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other representations
and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

FOR ^EFEN^ANlTB AR NUMB^R^
CERTEFICATC OF PROSECUTING ATTOI
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
(^J\(MCM/)

/ vp)
PpL S

, defendant. I have reviewed this statement of the

defendant and find that the declaration, including the elements of the offense of the charge(s) and
'the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense are true
and correct. No improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been
offered to defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the statement and in the
attached plea agreement or as supplemented on record before the court. There is reasonable
cause to believe that the evidence would support ths conviction of defendant for the offense(s)

al *i Pi j u S

for which the plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

W ^ . Wi^

NG ATTORNEY/BAR
A7TC
PROSECUTING
NUMBER

ORDER

Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea of
(guilty) (no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that the defendant's plea
of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) set forth in the statement be accepted and entered.
DONE IN COURT th«

£

day of CU^tA^t~~

SANDRA N. PEULER,
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

19?'£
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